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Abstract
As cyber attacks have become increasingly frequent and complex, the need for effective cy-
bersecurity training has become essential. This master thesis was developed in collaboration
with the client organization NC-Spectrum, with the objective of developing an alternative
training program utilizing cyber ranges and gamified training for OT-personnel in the Nor-
wegian energy sector. The need additional training was identified by the client organiza-
tion initially, and reinforced through the findings from the literature review and interviews
conducted as part of this thesis. Current training methods commonly use one-way commu-
nication, which has been shown to be inefficient for facilitating motivation and knowledge
retention. As the thesis has employed the design science research method (DSR), an arti-
fact called OTnetic was produced as a result of this thesis. The artifact was created using
multiple open source technologies and tools. The requirements for OTnetic, were elicited
by analyzing the interviews and creating user stories. OTnetic allows trainees to acquire
knowledge and practical skills by completing tasks in a cyber range environment. The cyber
range is supplemented with a quiz and information about a given cyber security related
question. As the target audience for training in this thesis have been found to have limited
cybersecurity knowledge, a module on password security was developed in the first DSR
cycle. The entire training program was accessible through the learning management system,
Moodle. The artifact was tested by conducting a lab experiment, and evaluated based on a
set of pre-defined metrics for evaluating the quality of the software and the training content.
Furthermore, the results indicate that gamification and cyber range based training can be
an efficient and motivating method to teach cybersecurity to OT-personnel in the Norwegian
energy sector. Moreover, OTnetic outperformed lecture-based training when tested by two
groups of participants lacking knowledge of cyber security and information technology. The
research presented in this thesis can be of great value to companies in the Norwegian energy
sector, and contribute to closing the research gap identified in the thesis.
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The frequency, sophistication and impact of cyber attacks has increased over the years as
adversaries have continued to develop their skills and applied more advanced attack meth-
ods, tactics and strategies (Nagarajan, Allbeck, Sood, & Janssen, 2012). Such attacks have
the potential to cause great financial losses, and compromise the privacy of user data and
the integrity of systems (Kamiya, Kang, Kim, Milidonis, & Stulz, 2018). In order for an
organization to be prepared for future threats, training and preparing for a variety of at-
tacks is crucial. Organizations need to not only have technical security controls and a solid
security culture, but also train for and simulate cyber attacks in order to prepare for future
attacks and stay updated on the current threat landscape. This enables stakeholders to
act appropriately in crisis situations. Due to the progressively complex cyber threat land-
scape, organizations are forced to recognize the importance of a strong cybersecurity posture.
Because cyber threats have become a growing issue for companies where IT plays a strategic
role, cybersecurity preparedness has become increasingly salient in the effort to protect the
enterprise. Preparedness can be viewed as how an organization reacts to, and prepares for an
attack, with the goal of preventing them or mitigating their impact. Effective cybersecurity
preparedness requires training and familiarity with the systems that need protection. Fur-
thermore it is necessary to have awareness regarding different types of threats, whether they
are malicious, or arise from negligent or oblivious insiders. This is particularly crucial in or-
ganizations that develop, operate and maintain critical infrastructure, as they provide society
with basic human needs. Critical energy infrastructure (CEI) organizations are particularly
attractive targets for terrorists and foreign governments during wartime (Onyeji, Bazilian, &
Bronk, 2014). Therefore, these it is crucial that these organizations are sufficiently protected.
Cyber attacks are a new and emerging threat to critical infrastructure sectors, which his-
torically have more experience with physical attacks (MacKinnon et al., 2013). Attacks on
monitoring and security equipment using Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to
shut down systems and malware attacks have been used against energy companies in the
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past (MacKinnon et al., 2013). Onyeji et al. (2014) refer to this as cyber-enabled physi-
cal attacks, a class of cyber-physical threats that use virtual attacks to facilitate physical
damage on critical infrastructure. Despite this threat to the energy sector, OT-personnel
(operational technology) and industrial control systems (ICS) maintenance staff generally
lack awareness of information technology and cybersecurity (Onyeji et al., 2014). The poten-
tial impact of cyber attacks in the energy sector necessitates a form of cybersecurity training
that is effective and engaging for employees who do not work directly with cybersecurity or
information technology. Cyber ranges offer this opportunity, but current research is lacking
solutions tailored for users with little prior knowledge about information security. A cyber
range is a realistic simulation of the networks, systems, applications, and devices in a training
environment, which facilitates cyber threat awareness and skills training through education,
exercises and competition (NIST, 2018).
Critical infrastructure comprises physical and information technology systems and assets
that are so essential to society that any disruption of their services could have a serious im-
pact on national security, economic well-being, public health or safety, or any combination
these factors (Alcaraz & Zeadally, 2015). The energy sector is especially critical because
in addition to private individuals, virtually all industries depend on this sector to function.
According to CISA (2020), the energy sector, which is the focus of this thesis, is well aware
of its vulnerabilities and is leading a significant voluntary effort to increase its planning and
preparedness.
During this thesis project, it was discovered that IT-professionals in the Norwegian energy
sector have strong cybersecurity knowledge and skills. The primary challenge however, is the
lack of cybersecurity awareness and skills by employees with non-technical roles, resulting
in security incidents caused by negligence or obliviousness. Moreover, there is a disconnect
between IT-employees and employees who work with operational technology (OT).
This finding was part of the motivation for creating of new training program designed for
use with OT-personnel. Additionally, the client organization, NC-Spectrum, has expressed
a need for a training method that utilizes cyber ranges for training employees who are not
experienced with information technology or information security. The client organization
is introduced in greater detail in section 3.2.1. The objective of the thesis was to examine
existing frameworks and methodologies for cybersecurity preparedness training and assess
their effectiveness. Furthermore, the thesis aims to discover gaps in existing frameworks
and methodologies for cybersecurity training, before addressing those gaps by proposing an
alternate training program. Finally, an artifact was produced in the form of a training pro-
gram that is designed to be used by enterprises in the energy sector. The training program
includes a cyber range and an LMS (learning management system) with training content
and a quiz. Because the focus of this research has been on Norwegian energy companies,
the program was assessed by creating evaluation metrics derived from interviews, the foun-
2
dational security principles proposed by The Norwegian National Security Authority, and
"Kraftbredskapsforskriften" (Energy Preparedness Regulation).
1.1 Research Questions
In order to address the research gap identified in this thesis, the following two research
questions were posed.
• How can cyber ranges be utilized as a cybersecurity training tool for OT-employees in
the energy sector?
• What limitations exist in current practical training exercises and programs related to
cybersecurity preparedness in enterprises in the Norwegian energy sector?
To answer these questions, a training program called OTnetic was developed, which uses
a cyber range approach with elements of gamification and simulation in order to motivate
employees and create practical skills to help them combat existing and future threats. The
cyber range oriented training applies a narrative story, with progressively challenging tasks.
In order to ensure that tasks are completed in the correct order and to reduce the learning
curve, a program simulating the commands used in the Linux based cyber range was created.
This is ensure that no prior knowledge of terminal commands is required to complete the
training. This project aims to understand what frameworks and types of training currently
exists for OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector, and to provide these organizations
with an effective training program in order to increase their preparedness and cybersecurity
posture.
1.2 Disposition
This section introduces the remaining chapters of the thesis, and provides an overview of
their contents.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Background
This chapter presents existing research, theory and literature that is relevant to, or provides
background on, the research project. The method used to conduct the literature review is
also presented in this chapter. The following concepts are elaborated upon in the chapter:
Cyber ranges, cybersecurity training, simulation and gamification. Section 2.2 presents the
literature review method and the findings from the literature.
Chapter 3: Research Approach
This chapter explains the research methodology that was used during the project. Firstly,
the research approach is presented. Secondly, the research strategy is described, including
the role of design science research (DSR) for empirical evaluation of the artifact. Thereafter,
a description of the data collection (3.2), analysis (3.2.3), and lastly a description of the
3
client organization and their role in this project (3.2.1).
Chapter 4: Interview Findings
This chapter presents the interview findings from the six interviews used to elicit require-
ments for the artifact.
Chapter 5: The Development of the OTnetic Cyber Training Program
This chapter describes the system requirements for OTnetic (5.1), the system design includ-
ing the system architecture (5.2), training content that was created for the lab experiment
(5.3), various tools and frameworks used in the development of the artifact (5.4), and lastly
the method for evaluating the artifact (5.6).
Chapter 6: Artifact Evaluation
This chapter presents the results from the quantitative (6.1) and the qualitative (6.2) analysis
conducted after the lab experiment. Furthermore, this chapter describes the different tests
that were performed and their limitations.
Chapter 7: Discussion
This chapter provides discussions and analysis of the results presented in chapter 6. Further-
more, limitations of the study are presented in section 7.1, in addition to points for further
development, which are outlined in section 7.4. Lastly, we present implications for research
in section 7.3.
Chapter 8: Conclusion The last chapter provides conclusions from the findings, and





This chapter provides an overview of prior research that is relevant for the thesis. Further-
more, a literature review has been conducted to determine the state of the art in the area
of cybersecurity preparedness, which aided in the development of the OTnetic cybersecurity
training program. The conclusions drawn from the literature review are presented later in
this chapter. Lastly, gaps in current research are identified, and solutions to close this gap
are proposed.
2.1 Background
This thesis aims to use and extend state-of-the-art approaches in cybersecurity training,
cybersecurity assurance, simulation, and cyber range tools and platforms. Security prac-
tices and training has been applied within industry for many years (Evans, Maglaras, He, &
Janicke, 2016). Regardless, there are still weaknesses in the cybersecurity posture of many
organizations, evidenced by the ever increasing number of attacks on companies around the
world. Ideally, organizations would have complete cybersecurity assurance by ensuring avail-
ability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Moreover, measures
to ensure these qualities should be able to facilitate restoration of information systems by in-
corporating protective, detective and reactive capabilities (Kick, 2014). As mentioned earlier
however, significant gaps still exist in the security posture of many organizations. Training
programs used to increase security awareness, increase compliance with security policies and
technologies like cyber ranges have been used in an attempt to mitigate cyber attacks, and
to train employees. Gamification has also been incorporated into tools for security training.
Research shows that using game design can provide engaging cybersecurity training for a
wide range of roles and skill levels (Nagarajan et al., 2012). Gamification of cybersecurity
training shows great promise, and can be an effective tool in providing effective cybersecurity
training (Boopathi, Sreejith, & Bithin, 2015).
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Despite the fact that various solutions for cyber range training already exist, most offer
a fixed number of scenarios, role or domain specific limitations, minimal automation, and
often lack interaction with actual emulated cyber environments, resulting in a lack of realism
(Somarakis, Smyrlis, Fysarakis, & Spanoudakis, 2019). Additionally, cyber range training
has not yet been adapted to suit the needs of employees working with operational technology.
This type of training is still mainly directed towards employees working with cybersecurity
or information technology. As IT and OT are becoming more intertwined, caused in part
by vendors increasingly transitioning to cloud-based services, operational systems are more
exposed to the same attacks that threaten IT systems. Furthermore, energy companies are
required to make parts of the data generated by the OT systems available to customers,
making availability imperative.
Furthermore, there is an abundance of cybersecurity training tools available that aim rais-
ing awareness and improve technical skills, as mentioned in the previous section. However,
these tools do not take NSM’s basic security principles and "Kraftberedskapsforskriften" into
account. "Kraftberedskapsforskriften" describes regulatory requirements for security in or-
ganizations working with critical infrastructure in Norway. NSM’s basic security principles
are a set of guidelines developed for Norwegian organizations. There is also a lack of com-
parison between training frameworks and exercises, making it hard to establish the efficacy
and differences of different training frameworks.
Considering the lack of comparison between existing training methods and which methods
are most effective, a viable solution may be to perform independent research on companies in
the energy sector to determine which training methods are best suited for employees this sec-
tor. As the literature review later illustrates, a gamified approach to cybersecurity awareness
and skills training may be advantageous in order to engage and motivate employees. The gap
between IT and OT identified in the literature can potentially be bridged by examining them
separately and comparing their commonalities and differences in order to determine their
relationship. Further research should be done to determine why some employees disregard
the value of cybersecurity training and the importance of their participation in protecting
the organization. To further close the research gap, the training program that was made
during this thesis takes the unique security situation and regulatory requirements of the
energy sector into account.
Organizations in the energy sector have two main departments directly involved in tech-
nology, IT (information technology) and OT (operational technology). As identified in the
interviews conducted during this research project, the differences between these departments
are substantial in regards to attitudes towards security, safety, update routines etc. This
is due to fundamental differences in requirements and expectations related to IT and OT
systems. The interview findings show that IT-employees place greater importance on issues
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of information and systems security. Conversely, OT-personnel are more concerned with
safety and the availability of OT systems. This finding is supported by Jaatun, Moe, and
Istad (2018), who state in their report about cybersecurity in digital transformation stations
that there is a challenge in the energy sector with cultural difference between IT and OT
employees.
2.1.1 Current State of Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure
Organizations
In 2014, Unisys published a report summarizing the state of cybersecurity in sectors dealing
with critical infrastructure by conducting a quantitative analysis. The participants were 599
different global IT and IT security executives from 13 different countries. Most of these were
highly industrialized countries in North America, Europe and Oceania. Unisys (2014) report
that even though 67% of the respondents say their companies have had at least one security
incident that resulted in loss of confidential information or disruption to operation over the
last 12 months, few of them view security as one of their top priorities. The most ominous
finding was that out of all of the participants who worked with critical infrastructure, only
43% stated that they were committed to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. Ad-
ditionally, 47% stated that the root cause of security breaches was an internal accident or a
mistake (Unisys, 2014).
Unisys (2014) further reports that 70% of critical infrastructure providers across 13 countries
suffered a data breach in 2013, and it was found that 54% of those breaches were a result
of employee negligence. Additionally, only 6% of these companies provided cybersecurity
training for all their employees. The fact that 54% of breaches are a result of negligent or
oblivious insiders demonstrates the need for more cybersecurity training for all employees,
especially those with limited IT knowledge. Such training may be expensive, but according
to research, organizations that offer new-hire cybersecurity training report approximately
76% lower average annual losses than those that do not offer such training (PwC, 2014).
Currently, cybersecurity skills training is primarily limited to employees who work with IT,
while other employees are limited to awareness training consisting of campaigns, newsletters
and instructor-led training. Furthermore, the training sessions provided a large amount of
information in a short amount of time, leading to a passive, overwhelming, and disconnected
learning experience (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). As mentioned previously, one possible
solution to optimise training, engage employees and increase motivation is by incorporating
gamification into training.
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate released a report in 2017 describing
the current state of cybersecurity in the Norwegian energy sector by conducting a survey.
Roughly half of the participants were ICT security coordinators, while the other half con-
sisted of managers and other employees from 88 different companies. The most frequent form
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of attack was phishing and attempted fraud, according to 51% of the participants (Azam,
2017). However, according to 34% of the participants, the attacks that caused the highest
impact were malware attacks compromising the integrity and availability of data, such as
ransomware. Over 40% of these participants did not know what caused the incident, while
35% stated that it was mainly due to human error. Both of the latter two numbers decreases
drastically as the company gets bigger (Azam, 2017).
There are several threats unique to the energy sector. According to Bigham, Gamez, and Lu
(2003), some of the potential malicious actions an adversary can perform inside an electric
SCADA system includes changing data values, changing control signals, opening breakers,
fraud and overloading. Firstly, by manipulating data readings in the SCADA system, an
attacker may be able to deceive the system operators in regards to power and voltages on
the grid. This can put the electricity grid into a dangerous state because operators may act
on false information (Bigham et al., 2003). Furthermore, an attacker could clock control
signals and issue false confirmations, causing operators to think breakers are closed when
they are open, or leading them to believe that a functional transformer is malfunctioning.
Additionally, if an attacker is able to overload the electricity system by switching on a large
amount of devices during a period of high demand for power, they could potentially cause
great damage to electrical units (Bigham et al., 2003). Lastly, smart meter data could be
fraudulently manipulated by malicious customers in an effort to save money on power.
Companies in the Norwegian energy sector are subject to regulations called "kraftbered-
skapsforskriften", which specifies physical and IT-security requirements, as well as manda-
tory yearly training exercises (Azam, 2017). This regulation sets the standard for security
in the Norwegian energy sector. Companies that comply with the regulation fully should
in theory be well protected and prepared for cyber potential security incidents. However,
some organizations in the energy sector do not comply fully with this comprehensive regula-
tion yet. Organizations that are unsure of their current security status may use a maturity
model. A maturity model is a set of characteristics, attributes, indicators, or patterns that
represent capability and progression in a particular discipline (Curtis & Mehravari, 2015).
According to Curtis and Mehravari (2015), model content typically exemplifies best prac-
tices and may incorporate standards or other codes of practice of the discipline. A maturity
model provides a benchmark against which organizations can evaluate the current level of ca-
pability of its practices, processes, and methods and set goals and priorities for improvement.
In order to evaluate the cybersecurity maturity level of an organization in the energy sec-
tor, a model called the cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model(C2M2) can be used. This
maturity model is specifically designed to focus on the implementation and management
of IT and OT assets and their operational environment (Curtis & Mehravari, 2015). The
model consists of 10 domains that are logical groupings of cybersecurity practices and four
maturity levels (0-3) for each domain. The model domains align well with the CERT Re-
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silience Management Model (CERT-RMM) (Curtis & Mehravari, 2015). The model could
be useful for organizations in the energy sector as a tool to continuously assess and improve
their current security maturity level. Moreover, the model will allow companies to share
knowledge, best practices, and relevant references. Additionally, it can enable organizations
to prioritize actions and investments in the cybersecurity domain. However, the model does
not provide specific methods or measures to achieve better cybersecurity preparedness. Nor
does it provide training guidelines for employees or managers. However, the model could
be a useful tool in combination with proper training and implementation of specific security
measures and controls.
Cybersecurity training is a crucial response to a growing number of intrusions and attacks.
Despite 80% of all vulnerabilities exploited being attributed to human vulnerabilities, the
focus of cybersecurity has been on technology and securing systems (Adams & Makramalla,
2015). Human vulnerabilities include negligent or oblivious insiders, misinformation and
limited cybersecurity skills training, malicious insiders, and third parties who have access to
an organization’s network, such as consultants.
2.2 Literature Review
This section describes literature review that was conducted as part of this thesis project.
The method is presented first, followed by findings and conclusions. The preferred method
for this literature review was a systematic literature review (SLR).
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Figure 2.1: Systematic Literature Review
(Okoli & Schabram, 2010)
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2.2.1 Systematic Literature Review Method
The systematic literature review performed in this thesis was performed in accordance with
the process suggested by Okoli and Schabram (2010), as seen in figure 2.1. This technique
integrates, evaluates and interprets findings of multiple qualitative and quantitative research
studies. Literature was selected based the criteria presented in the sections below, before it
was synthesized and conclusions were drawn.
Motivation
The systematic literature review provides an analytical review of literature that is relevant for
this thesis project. The primary motivation for this literature review was to provide greater
insight into existing training methods and programs, as well as the simulation methods and
types that were available at the time of writing this thesis. This insight has established the
knowledge required to propose a new training program that is better suited for companies
in the energy sector, and increases training efficiency and motivation.
As this is a systematic literature review, information sources were not excluded by sub-
jective metrics. Furthermore, literature was objectively evaluated with a focus on avoiding
the interference of bias. Additionally, care was taken to not misrepresent the findings or
opinions of researchers. Criteria for including and excluding literature have been carefully
chosen in order to adhere to the requirements of the chosen methodology. In order to achieve
the goal of understanding the literature surrounding the thesis topic better, the purpose of
the literature must align with the criteria stated below.
Literature Criteria The first selection criteria was that the literature needed to align
with at least one of the basic criteria defined below.
• Identify unique security and compliance requirements for organizations in the energy
sector
• To classify security issues for organizations in the energy sector
• Identify and analyze existing training programs and training frameworks within cyber-
security
• Identify gaps in existing training programs and frameworks within cybersecurity
• To answer our specific research questions.
Search
The search engines and databases IEEE Xplore, Scopus and Google Scholar were used in
order to search for relevant literature during the literature review process. These search
engines provided sufficient results, as they aggregate literature from multiple locations and
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provide a comprehensive library of sources. During the search, relevant literature was down-
loaded and saved in a shared folder using cloud storage software.
The following search queries were used when searching for relevant literature:
• Cybersecurity training and simulation
• Cybersecurity preparedness
• Cyber ranges
• Cybersecurity energy sector
• Energy sector security awareness
• Beredskap og sikkerhet energisektoren (Preparedness and security in the energy sector)
• Gamification of cyber training
Practical Screen
The following selection criteria were also used in the selection process.
• Publication language: The literature must be written in English or Norwegian.
• Date of publication: As the threat landscape, external compliance requirements and
technology changes in a rapid pace, the literature on training for cybersecurity pre-
paredness should have a publication date after 2010. However, if the content of the
report is relevant for today, data may be extracted regardless of the publication date.
• No duplicate literature will be included.
• Literature cited by more sources will be prioritized over similar articles with fewer
citations.
• Literature cited by no sources will be excluded.
Quality Appraisal
Lastly, the following criteria were set for quality appraisal of selected literature:
1. Does the literature align with the criteria for source selection as defined in the purpose
section?
2. Does the study address a clearly focused question?
3. Did the study use valid methods to address this question? Does the study design and
conduct try to eliminate the potential for systematic error (bias)?
4. Are the results valid and applicable to the target audience?
5. Is the literature relevant to the research questions?
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Data Extraction and Synthesis of Studies
Data extraction is a systematic process where all information applicable for the research was
identified and extracted from each study. The data was extracted in an external document.
The extracted data was then synthesized in section 2.2.2. The extraction is not included, as
it was only used as the foundation of the synthesis. The findings were summarized and the
sources were linked to each other to highlight similar findings in the different studies.
Findings
The findings in section 2.2.2 present all the findings from the synthesis. A goal for this study
was to document the method of the literature review properly in order to make possible to
make the findings and results reproducible. This means that if a group of researchers are
following the same steps described in this report they should receive similar results.
Selected Literature
The articles listed were selected based on the inclusion criteria presented throughout section
2.2.1. Articles and studies that did not match any of the inclusion criteria, were excluded
from the literature review. The following list can be used as aid to correlate the titles of
selected literature with authors listed in the table below. A total of 22 articles were selected
for this literature review.
• Cybersecurity skills training: an attacker-centric gamified approach (Adams & Makra-
malla, 2015)
• Improving information security awareness and behaviour through dialogue, participa-
tion and collective reflection. An intervention study (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010)
• Challenges of implementing training and awareness programs targeting cybersecurity
social engineering (Aldawood & Skinner, 2019)
• Incident-centered information security: Managing a strategic balance between preven-
tion and response (Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & Kim, 2014)
• Cytrone: An integrated cybersecurity training framework (Beuran et al., 2017)
• Safeguarding SCADA systems with anomaly detection (Bigham et al., 2003)
• Learning Cybersecurity Through Gamification (Boopathi et al., 2015)
• Evaluating and improving cybersecurity capabilities of the energy critical infrastructure
(Curtis & Mehravari, 2015)
• Cybersecurity educational programs: costs and benefits (Dumitru & Ion, 2019)
• ICSrange: A Simulation-based Cyber Range Platform for Industrial Control Systems
(Giuliano & Formicola, 2019)
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• Cybersikkerhet i digitale transformatorstasjoner (Jaatun et al., 2018)
• Toward a New Meta-Theory for Designing Information Systems (IS) Security Training
Approaches (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011)
• Exploring game design for cybersecurity training (Nagarajan et al., 2012)
• Informasjonssikkerhetstilstanden i energiforsyningen (Azam, 2017)
• Cybersecurity and Critical Energy Infrastructure (Onyeji et al., 2014)
• Developing disaster management capability: an assessment centre approach (Paton &
Jackson, 2002)
• Assessing emergency management training and exercises (Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, &
Paton, 2012)
• Intervention Effect Rates as a Path to Research Relevance: Information Systems Se-
curity Example (Siponen & Baskerville, 2018)
• Improving employees’ compliance through information systems security training: an
action research study (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010)
• Model-driven cyber range training: A cybersecurity assurance perspective (Somarakis
et al., 2019)
• The duality of information security management: Fighting against predictable and
unpredictable threats (Spagnoletti & Resca, 2008)
• Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity (Unisys, 2014)
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Figure 2.2: Assessment Criteria
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2.2.2 Findings from Literature Analysis
This section presents the findings elicited from the selected literature presented in figure
2.2 and section 2.2.1. As the literature covers many different aspects of cybersecurity, the
findings were divided into different sections based on common themes. The following topics
were selected for this literature review: use of theoretical frameworks for improved training,
cybersecurity training for preparedness, simulation and gamification, and incident response.
Use of Theoretical Frameworks for Improved Training
According to Puhakainen and Siponen (2010), there is a lack of research on theory-based
and empirically evaluated training programs. There are however, a number of theories that
can aid in improving the learning outcome of employee training. Moreover, much of the
literature on training use anecdotal conclusions. This can be avoided by using theory-based
training programs, and empirical testing such as action design research (ADR) or design
science research (DSR). In their ADR project, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) were able
to validate the efficacy of their training program. The program used two different learning
theories as its foundation; the universal constructive instructional theory(UCIT), and the
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Training programs and
tools that lack an underlying theoretical foundation may be effective in certain scenarios,
but fail to provide value in other situations due to lack of understanding of the tool’s limita-
tions (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Therefore, security training programs should provide
a theoretical explanation for how and why the program works. Empirical evidence further
indicates the practical efficacy of the program. During the thesis project, empirical data was
generated by evaluating the efficacy of the training program with appropriate participants.
Participant selection is further detailed in the participant selection part of section 5.6.1.
Alternative theories that can be used in order to increase employee compliance includes
punitive measures such as sanctions and other deterrence theories. Despite non-punitive
measures like cognitive education and training being more effective in justifying compliance
in certain types of people (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), Puhakainen and Siponen (2010)
explain that using sanctions does diminish computer abuse. However, according to Pahnila,
Siponen, and Mahmood (2007), sanctions and other negative reinforcement strategies only
increase the intention to comply, not actual compliance. Conversely, training employees on
safe computer use and company policies may prove more effective.
Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) break theoretical orientation of the training into three cate-
gories when theory of education is used. These are (1) behaviorism, (2) cognitivism, and (3)
constructivism. The first of which emphasizes instructor-led teaching with one-way interac-
tion, the specification of measurable and observable behavioral objectives and quantitative
measurement, and the use of reinforcement to gain the learning outcomes. The latter stresses
the interactive, two-way communication between the learners, which activates the learners’
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thinking processes and critical reflection of their knowledge (Karjalainen, 2009; Hung, 2001).
One theory that can be used to design effective training includes the universal constructive
instruction theory (UCIT).
The universal constructive instructional theory is a four-phase framework used to guide
the training design process. The four phases are (1) determination of the instructional task,
(2) diagnosis of current state of the learner, (3) constructing and delivering instruction, and
(4) diagnosis of success (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). The learning task can be defined as
the overall goal or outcome of the training, and is the sum of the learners current knowledge
and required knowledge. After determining the learning task and establishing the current
knowledge of the learner, instructional tasks can be constructed and delivered. Lastly, suc-
cess is assessed by verifying to what degree trainees have acquired relevant knowledge. This
is the process that was in the lab experiment conducted in this thesis.
One of the crucial elements for the design and delivery of instructions is functions. The
functions of UCIT are related to knowledge, and are defined as: (1) acquisition of knowl-
edge, (2) storage of knowledge, and (3) use of knowledge (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010).
The basic components of instruction are defined as the (1) learning environment (including
the instruction, teaching methods and media), (2) the learning task (i.e. better cybersecurity
preparedness in OT-personnel), (3) the learners, and (4) the place in which the instruction
takes place (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Acquisition of new knowledge (function) and the
learner (component) forms the core of learning (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Moreover,
the training should leverage the learners previous knowledge in order to efficiently acquire
new knowledge, which can be assessed via surveys or interviews. In order to effectively stim-
ulate the learners previous knowledge prior to delivering instructional tasks, Puhakainen and
Siponen (2010) suggest using group discussions with practical tasks. Furthermore, employ-
ees should be divided into different groups based on their knowledge levels. However, how
predictable will these changes be? The theory described next can be used an indicator the
efficiency of training.
The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) explains how predictable, long-lasting behavioral
changes can be achieved through cognitive processing, and that short-lived changes can be
avoided by not relying on cues. Prerequisites for cognitive processing includes motivation
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Therefore, training should use learning and instructional
tasks that are personally relevant for the learners. Cognitive processing of persuasive infor-
mation is necessary for long-lasting behavioral changes (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). It is
therefore important for a training program to facilitates cognitive processing. Puhakainen
and Siponen (2010) further state that avoiding reliance of cues is essential, as changes re-
lying on cues are short-lived and unpredictable. Cues include reactions of others, speaker
credibility, external rewards and the attractiveness of the speaker.
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Cybersecurity awareness training aims to change and develop attitudes and perceptions
of employees to act more responsibly and follow the internal security policy. According to
Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) this can be achieved by employing a training framework
based on the understanding that the nature of information security training is persuasive
and non-cognitive. They argue that IS security procedures are non-cognitive because they
are created in an organizational context, and not necessarily based on scientific reasoning
or facts. There are three existentialistic features of IS security training: (1) the existence
of security-sensitive organizational assets, (2) threats towards these assets, (3) different so-
cial, technical and organizational mechanisms to protect the assets (Karjalainen & Siponen,
2011). Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) further state that due to the intangible nature of IS
security threats and assets, the consequences of having bad information information may be
difficult for employees to understand. Therefore, employees have to understand the conse-
quences of their actions, for example the consequences of sending confidential information
in plain text over an unencrypted connection. There are three different levels of thinking
related to cybersecurity: meta, critical and intuitive (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011). The
meta-level is about the fundamental questions, for example "Why is cybersecurity impor-
tant?". The critical-level is about critical thinking related to conventional activities, meaning
that one critically reflects upon the actions being performed. Lastly, intuitive thinking refers
to conventional activities in practice. A person’s intuitive thinking is based on previous ex-
periences like upbringing, education and other personal experiences. Critical thinking allows
for change in the intuitive thinking (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011).
Cybersecurity Training for Preparedness
Training and simulation in the domain of cybersecurity is already well established, with
multiple training methods and simulation frameworks being proposed. This provides a lot
to work with in terms of relevant research material. One the findings from the literature
was that simulation exercises greatly increases the skills and motivation of employees (Paton
& Jackson, 2002). According Paton and Jackson (2002), multiple simulations and exercises
should be used in order to create predictive validity. Disaster readiness and planning is
of great importance in the energy sector, as they are responsible for critical infrastructure.
These are also situations of high pressure environments.
According to Sinclair et al. (2012), training in high pressure environments will not only
allow for technical and managerial skill development but will also give an indicator of how
the participants are likely to react to stressors, and what should be done in order to minimize
the negative reactions to these stressors. The goal of such training is to develop a form of
stress resilience and competency when new decisions have to be made in a critical emer-
gency situation. However, opportunities for training with real world disasters are few and
far between. This makes it difficult for people working with critical infrastructure to acquire
realistic disaster response experience, without some form of simulation-based training.
18
Beuran et al. (2017) have established a set requirements for an effective cybersecurity train-
ing program. The requirements are as follows: a cybersecurity training program should
(1) contain appropriate training content for the target audience in terms of knowledge and
ability levels; (2) contain training content corresponding with the skills the program aims to
develop; (3) use hands-on activities and exercises to make the training more memorable and
realistic; (4) reach a large audience to generalize the training; (5) have sufficient cost contra
performance characteristics to make the program sustainable in the long term.
Security awareness training is typically provided using top-down delivery methods, such as
lectures, e-mail campaigns, leaflets and posters. Through their research however, Albrechtsen
and Hovden (2010) demonstrate that local employee participation, collective reflection and
group processes produce a mutual understanding of routines in organisational work, which
is fundamentally important for the interaction in an organization. Interaction in groups
facilitates participation and collective thinking. Additional methods to enrich the learning
experience and motivate trainees further is to add gamification by applying game-design
elements and game principles the training process.
Simulation and Gamification
There are several benefits to using simulation based training in the energy sector, and in the
cybersecurity domain in general. Some of the benefits of simulation based training include
increased self-efficacy for training subjects, increased situational awareness and development
of shared mental models for the team (Paton & Jackson, 2002). Furthermore, such train-
ing exercises facilitate development of specific skills, as well as increasing the motivation of
employees. By giving a team of employees a common goal to work towards, their ability
to collaborate increases as well. For training exercises to be efficient, accurate and relevant
feedback is important to ensure cost effectiveness and future needs. Moreover, feedback
after training increases the motivation and interest of trainees, in addition to reinforcing
self-efficacy (Paton & Jackson, 2002). Cybersecurity awareness training plays a key role in
an organization’s ability to remain prepared for future cyber attacks. Adams and Makra-
malla (2015) claim that typical security awareness programs do not equip employees with
the necessary skills required to actively participate in cyber attack prevention. Further, they
suggest that gamification of cybersecurity training is an effective way to cost-effectively arm
employees with cybersecurity skills to better protect the business while reducing the finan-
cial impact of cyber attacks (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). Gamification is the process of
enhancing a specific service by implementing game design elements in a non-game context.
The goal is to enhance the user’s overall value creation and experience (Adams & Makra-
malla, 2015). As mentioned previously, gamification of training exercises increases the skills
and motivation of employees (Paton & Jackson, 2002).
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Some crucial game design elements that are useful in cyber attack simulations are: progress
mechanics, player control, problem solving and storytelling (Adams & Makramalla, 2015).
Problem solving is an important element used in game design that fosters collaboration
and critical thinking in order to solve problems. Moreover, the cyber-attacker community’s
ability to find common goals and collaborate to achieve them is illustrated to the employ-
ees, creating a better understanding. When designing games for training and educational
purposes, training goals must be clearly defined (Nagarajan et al., 2012). Additionally,
Adams and Makramalla (2015) suggest three relevant components that help employees stay
motivated and engaged in the training exercises:
1. Feedback: Visual feedback like losing lives, triggering warning screens or earning re-
wards. As long as the employees are engaged in the game, the game will provides
feedback, evaluate skill levels, and create obstacles to evaluate the various skill sets of
the employees and comparing those results to the target level of achievement.
2. Increased challenge: Increasing difficulty is a progress mechanic used in game design.
Employees require increasing difficulty in order to stay engaged, and apply critical
thinking.
3. Opportunities for mastery: The game should provide opportunities to develop skills
and excel, granting a feeling of mastery and increased confidence.
Boopathi et al. (2015) suggest a gamified CTF-style learning approach as a tool for teach-
ing cybersecurity. The competition or training session would consist of three rounds. The
first round is a learning round where participants are given tutorials related to cybersecurity
concepts like binary exploitation, reverse engineering, forensics, web application security etc.
This round engages the participants and ensures that they are familiar with basic security
concepts and implications. Next is the Jeopardy round. This is the round in which knowl-
edge regarding previously introduced concepts are tested by solving problems and questions
of varying complexity. Last is the interactive round, which aims to apply the concepts of
cybersecurity in real world scenarios (Boopathi et al., 2015).
In their game, the researchers have four levels. The first level tests general programming
skills, the second level tests web application security concepts, the third level tests application
security concepts. Lastly, reverse engineering and forensics concepts are tested (Boopathi
et al., 2015). The testers provided the participants with a virtual machine containing ap-
plications with known vulnerabilities that when exploited, would produce a flag. The game
could be performed in a cyber range style, with two teams aiming to gather points by both
attacking the other team, and defending their own team’s machines. Boopathi et al. (2015)
concur with Adams and Makramalla (2015) that utilizing gamification in training makes the
learning experience more fun for participants, increases motivation, and produces a greater
learning outcome.
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According to Giuliano and Formicola (2019), cyber ranges can be employed for team build-
ing, cyber training, capture the flag (CTF), research and development, testing, assessment,
and recruitment. Furthermore they have found that maintenance staff of Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) are generally not aware about information technologies, and even less about
cybersecurity problems, which supports the need for additional training in the energy sector
(Giuliano & Formicola, 2019). Cyber ranges offer this opportunity, but current research is
lacking cost-effective solutions verticalized for the industrial domain (Giuliano & Formicola,
2019). Furthermore, Spagnoletti and Resca (2008) have identified that new and emerging
threats necessitates the ability to develop a formative context where learning and innova-
tion are favoured over risk evaluation and action plans in order to establish a more secure
environment in organizations.
Incident Response
Regarding emergency management and emergency operations centers (EOCs), little informa-
tion exists about training assessment. Moreover, accepted preparedness practices are often
based on anecdotes, which are generally lacking in systemic study and objective validation
(Sinclair et al., 2012). This is largely due to difficulties associated with measuring team per-
formance and training effectiveness. However, organizations using training and assessment
programs often have programs unique to their organization, and the monitoring and the
evaluation aspect of the training is often overlooked. Therefore, it is mostly unknown how
effective emergency training is. The study conducted by Sinclair et al. (2012) concludes that
given the complexity of disaster response environments, training should be based on corre-
spondingly comprehensive techniques to provide holistic training and evaluation. Sinclair et
al. (2012) further argue that even though such training is more expensive, the benefits of
further developing capabilities for unknown events and disasters will lower the risk of losing
lives in the event of an actual disaster.
In relation to emergency response training it is recommended to divide the feedback ses-
sion into two different debriefs, an informal hot debrief immediately after the exercise, and
a more formal cold debrief held about a month after the exercise (Sinclair et al., 2012). Cy-
bersecurity awareness training as of today mostly comes in the form of lectures or seminars
held by security professionals. The target audience are often a group consisting of employees
with different backgrounds, ranging from managers to IT professionals to employees from
the finance department to name a few. It is difficult to create appropriate content that is un-
derstandable for participants with different backgrounds. Furthermore, seminars often lack
engagement from the participants, where there is mostly one-way communication, making
the training less memorable in contrast to hands-on activities like case studies or other more
practical exercises (Nagarajan et al., 2012).
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According to Baskerville et al. (2014), incident-centered information security management is
a theoretical and practical framework consisting of three elements: (1) situational analysis,
planning, and operation in the prevention paradigm; (2) situational analysis, planning, and
operation in the response paradigm; and (3) close attention to the time continuum in decid-
ing the balance of effort between (1) and (2). Both prevention and response are important
paradigms, but focus can shifted between them as organizational needs change. Unsophisti-
cated and repetitive attacks may only require prevention, but as the sophistication of attack
increase, so must the emphasis on activities in the response paradigm (Baskerville et al.,
2014). Typically, organizations that focus more on incident response operate in unstable
security environments, while ones that operate in a stable security environment focus more
on prevention.
2.2.3 Conclusions from the Literature Analysis
With the continuously evolving sophistication and increasing frequency of cyber attacks,
organizations face both a set of predictable threats and a set of new and emerging problems.
There are a plethora of methods for reducing risk of cyber incidents through implementation
of pertinent technical and procedural countermeasures. However, such techniques are more
effective on repetitive and simple attacks. Advanced attacks, in addition to attacks that
exploit the vulnerability of the organization’s human resources, are harder to prevent with
technical countermeasures. For example, despite most mature and developed organizations
having technical countermeasures against phishing attacks in place, such attacks are still
remarkably prevalent.
Organizations would be wise not to rely solely on their IT-department as protection against
the aforementioned attacks. Involving all employees by facilitating the acquisition of cy-
bersecurity skills across the entire organization will greatly increase their capability in the
preventive paradigm. Furthermore, research shows that traditional security awareness train-
ing is ineffective. Such training typically focuses on educating employees about common
cyber attacks, and providing a limited set of best practices for fundamental security. Train-
ing in this fashion may help raise awareness around security issues, but lacks the practical
and reflective aspect of security skills training that would help protect the organization from
future attacks. A contributing factor to the inefficiency of regular awareness training is its
failure to engage and motivate employees. Research shows that attack simulations and prac-
tical security skills training is significantly more beneficial.
Firstly, simulations allow employees to train for events and incidents that have rare oc-
currences. Secondly, simulations increase motivation among participants, increase memory
retention, create skills applicable in real incidents, and foster collaboration by providing com-
mon goals. These factors ultimately culminate in a greater learning outcome for employees.
Finally, the benefit of aforementioned training methods are enhanced by the implementation
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of gamification, which increases motivation and gives the participants a feeling of mastery.
Gamification has been shown to further increase the positive benefits provided by cyber-
security simulation training. Game design elements such as visual feedback, practical tasks
and progression of difficulty aid in the development of critical thinking and problem solving,
which would help to prevent unfamiliar threats. Very few organizations currently provide
cybersecurity training to all employees, suffering greater annual financial losses as a result.
In Norway, organizations in the energy sector are required by law to follow a set procedures
and requirements that relate to cybersecurity. Moreover, the law demands yearly training
exercises to be performed. Compliance with this regulation has not been determined in this
literature review, as there is little research on the legal compliance of Norwegian companies
in the energy sector.
Despite the large amount research on the aforementioned topics, there still exists a gap
in the research, which will be addressed in this thesis. Firstly, there is very little research
on area that focuses on Norwegian companies. Secondly, there is lack of studies directly
comparing and testing the efficacy of cyber range training against current common training
methods, such as lectures. Lastly, the studies on cyber ranges as training tools mostly focus
on training IT security professionals in penetration testing and defense. Moreover, there is
a lack of research on how these tools can be applied to training for OT-personnel and other
groups outside of IT professionals.
In summary, organizations in the energy sector should provide cybersecurity awareness
and skills training for all employees. Many companies in the energy sector have small IT-
departments, with few cybersecurity professionals, resulting in a general lack of resources
when identifying and mitigating attacks caused by both external attackers and negligent in-
siders. Furthermore, over 50% of breaches in critical infrastructure organizations are a result
of employee negligence. Therefore, training is a crucial investment to protect the enterprise
and reduce financial losses resulting from successful cyber attacks. Lastly, simulations and
game design elements should be included in the training. A maturity model can be used in
order to assess their current level of cybersecurity preparedness, and determine measures for





A research strategy describes the plan of the research project. For this project, the research
strategy is based on the activities included in the design science research method (DSR). DSR
has gained more popularity over the last years, especially for research related to information
systems (Cater-Steel, Toleman, & Rajaeian, 2019; Thuan, Drechsler, & Antunes, 2019). The
activities shown in section 3.1 are specifically tied to design science research (DSR) topics
related to the development and improvement of information systems (Peffers, Tuunanen,
Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007).
3.1 Design Science Research
For this thesis the design science research approach was employed, where an artifact is de-
signed and produced as a result of the research project. This method was chosen because it
facilitates the creation of an end product, or artifact, that is useful and provides a benefit to
the industry. Furthermore, this approach focuses on the design and development of artifacts
and performance evaluation of such artifacts. DSR aims to solve problems by developing an
artifact that solves problems identified in the real world and evaluating it against alterna-
tive solutions. The objective of this thesis project was to develop a cyber security training
program for OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector, called OTnetic. As the objective
of DSR aligns well with the objective of our project, this approach was found to be the most
appropriate.
In DSR, both qualitative and quantitative research methods are used in the process of
creating and evaluating the artifact. First, a qualitative approach is used in order to lay
the foundation for the requirement analysis. Second, a quantitative approach is used to
evaluate the artifact based on metrics elicited from the requirement analysis. The goal is to
provide a useful contribution to IT-professionals in the Norwegian energy sector. Interviews
were conducted in the beginning of this project, in order to provide better insight regarding
the status of cybersecurity preparedness in the Norwegian energy sector, regulatory require-
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ments, and what type of training program would be most valuable for Norwegian energy
companies. The following principles were employed, which are based on the design science
research methodology described by Peffers et al. (2007), for designing and developing the
artifact:
1. Activity 1: Problem identification and motivation
Establish the research problem and justify the need and value of a solution. A useful
tactic to achieve this is breaking up the problem conceptually to understand the degree
of complexity in addition to the scope of the problem. This activity is described in
chapter 1.
2. Activity 2: Define the objectives for a solution
Define the objectives of a solution based on the problem definition. It is important to
emphasize that these objectives should be both possible and feasible. The objectives,
or requirements, are elicited from interviews, which is described further in chapter 4.
3. Activity 3: Design and development
This activity is where the artifact itself is designed and created. The artifact can be
any designed object, but it must include a research contribution which is embedded
in the design of the artifact itself. Examples of artifacts are models, methods and
constructs. The main objectives for this activity is determining the functionality as
well as the architecture of the artifact about to be created. This activity is described
in chapter 5.
4. Activity 4: Demonstration
Use the artifact in a demonstration where the objective is to solve one or more instances
of the problem. This demonstration could be in the form of experimentation, simulation
or case study. A requirement for this activity is to include effective knowledge of how
the artifact should be used to solve the problem. The results from the demonstration
of the artifact is presented in chapter 6.
5. Activity 5: Evaluation
Evaluate the demonstration(s) and analyse whether the artifact supports an effective
solution to the research problem. This activity requires knowledge about what metrics
to use when evaluating the artifact based on what problem it should solve. The evalu-
ation should provide empirical evidence from the demonstration(s). The evaluation of
the artifact, based on the results from the lab experiment, is described in chapter 7.
6. Activity 6: Communication
Convey the problem and if it is important, in addition to the degree of importance
and why. This activity is mainly about communicating to other researcher (as well
as other relevant audiences) why this artifact is effective at solving the problem in
question. This activity was performed after finalizing the thesis. The findings were
presented to NC-Spectrum, with a focus on further development and how the artifact
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can be integrated with current cyber training in the energy sector.
Firstly, interviews were conducted with people who work in the energy sector. Secondly,
interview data was analyzed. The findings are presented as user stories in appendix E.
These findings were then used to elicit requirements for the artifact, and user stories were
produced based on the requirements. The user stories are categorized into two parts, (1)
software requirements, and (2) training content requirements. The testing and evaluation of
the OTnetic training program consisted of a lab experiment and a questionnaire as part of
the evaluation stage, which revealed how effective the artifact is in terms the participants’
ability to acquire new knowledge.
3.2 Interviews
As mentioned previously, a qualitative method was applied in order to provide insight when
eliciting requirements for evaluation of the produced artifact. Qualitative methods are ap-
plied in the early stages of the design science research process, as they lay the foundation
for the requirement analysis (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010). For the qualitative part of this
project, interviewing was used as the primary data collection method.
In total, six interviews were conducted; four of the interviews were conducted with four
different Norwegian energy companies, and two of them were conducted with companies
who respond to security incidents in the energy sector. The interviews were semi-structured,
and two interview guides were created to prepare and structure different focus areas with
questions relevant for requirement elicitation. The primary focus areas were the enter-
prise’s current status on cybersecurity training, attitudes towards cybersecurity, and the
participants’ opinions on using cyber range training with practical challenges to learn more
about cybersecurity. The interviews were conducted remotely, using Microsoft Teams. This
method was preferred due to the different geographical locations of the interview subjects,
and COVID-19 considerations. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. All but
one interview were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The one interview that was not
recorded, by request of the interview subject, was performed by writing notes instead. After
transcription, every interview was analyzed and broken down into themes, and the data was
used to elicit requirements for the artifact. All interview recordings and transcriptions were
deleted after use out of respect for the privacy of the interview subjects.
3.2.1 Client Organization
The client organization for the thesis project is called NC-Spectrum. NC-Spectrum is a Nor-
wegian company with high competence in networks and information security. Their mission
is to develop, sell, deliver and operate competence and services in the domains of digital in-
frastructure and information security (NC-Spectrum, n.d.). NC-Spectrum has participated
actively during the project by offering their advice and aiding in selecting interview subjects.
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Frequent meetings have been held with the client organization to keep stakeholders up to
date on the progress of the project.
3.2.2 Selecting Appropriate Interview Subjects
Prior to development of the thesis, NC-Spectrum expressed the need for a training program
tailored for OT-personnel, as the they work with multiple energy companies and has iden-
tified a need for additional training. Moreover, NC-Spectrum requested that a cyber range
was to be part of the program. Because the project aims to determine if cyber range train-
ing can be more effective than traditional training methods for OT-personnel in the energy
sector, employees working with OT in Norwegian energy companies would be most suited
to provide the appropriate answers to establish the requirements for the artifact, in addition
to the client organization of this thesis project. Fortunately, as NC-Spectrum works with
security incidents in the energy sector, they were able to provide valuable insight related to
the unique security challenges that OT-personnel face. This should provide an additional
layer of reliability regarding the training content and the requirements elicited from the
interviews, as OT-personnel may not be sufficiently informed about previous breaches and
how they themselves were involved either directly or indirectly.
OT-personnel is an umbrella term covering different professions working with operational
technology, which is operation of physical processes and machinery and software used to
carry them out (i.e. SCADA software). The artifact that was produced is intended for
operations engineers with knowledge of how to implement, operate and maintain operations
systems in an energy company. Employees working with this type of technology do not
share the same skills, attitudes and knowledge of cyber security as employees working with
information technology (IT).
3.2.3 Qualitative Analysis
As the research method chosen for the thesis was DSR, the interviews were used to provide
requirements for the artifact based on what the interview subjects want and expect from the
training program. Additionally, the interviews provided a number of themes that describe
the common denominators related to cybersecurity preparedness in the energy sector. The
data used to construct the requirements were a combination of the data elicited from these
interviews (both from questions and themes), and the data provided by the existing litera-
ture and theory.
After the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed in order to maintain the un-
derlying meaning and context. Furthermore, transcription simplified the analysis process,
as it provided a searchable and readable representation of the interviews. The answers
were then summarized in the findings section, and later compared to existing theory from
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the literature review, to check for correlations and validity. Lastly, the requirements were
elicited from the findings. The interview guides used during the six interviews are included





This chapter outlines the interview findings used for requirements elicitation for the OTnetic
cyber training program. The interview guides are located in appendix A and appendix B.
System requirements were derived from six interviews, which were conducted in order to un-
derstand how cybersecurity training with OT employees in the energy sector is performed.
Additionally, it was desirable to understand and how this training can be improved to in-
crease the security preparedness and awareness in the sector. Four of the interviews were
conducted with employees from companies that work in the energy sector, and two interview
was with a security company that has energy companies as customers. Evaluation metrics
for the artifact are described in section 5.6.3.
All of the interview subjects work with operational technology (OT) directly, indirectly as
managers of OT-personnel, or by having energy companies as clients. The primary function
of the interviews was to gain insight into the status of cybersecurity training in the Norwegian
energy sector, and uncover potential weaknesses in current training methods. Additionally,
the interviews provided information about what types of alternative training methods may
be more suitable than what is currently provided, and how cybersecurity training can be
improved. All the findings have been grouped into four different themes.
4.1 Training in the Energy Sector
OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector are given minimal amounts of training in re-
gard to cybersecurity concepts and best practices. Most of the training they receive relates
to health and safety, as well as training from vendors on how to use the equipment they
provide. Additionally, some security training is provided in the form of video lectures and
classes. However, the concepts that are described, which mostly relate to phishing, are simple
and lack any element of practical problem solving or critical thinking. All of the companies
interviewed have security policies that they are required to read. They are also required to
sign an agreement stating that they have understood its contents.
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However, these policies are typically reviewed once a year at most, and compliance with the
policies varies depending on the individual employee. Several interview subjects informed
us that policy compliance is sometimes overlooked when it prevents them from performing
their duties efficiently. One of the interview subjects mentioned that they have requested
more in-depth and challenging training, as much of the teaching material is currently sim-
ple and intuitive for most trainees. Some interview subjects stated that in current training
programs, much emphasis is placed on confirming email legitimacy with the IT department,
and not sharing passwords and user accounts with coworkers. Furthermore, internal IT em-
ployees are tasked with holding information meetings when the company has experienced
a cyber attack, but it is unclear if any proactive solutions are discussed. Another inter-
view subject mentioned that the company has organized multiple security campaigns. These
include mandatory lectures with questionnaires that ensure participant engagement. It is
unclear what happens if an employee does not successfully get through the course, but this
would be followed up by management. These campaigns also provide employees with the
opportunity to raise questions and receive additional information and clarification if they are
interested. None of the companies interviewed had security training directed specifically at
OT-personnel, and when asked, most of them expressed that they would like more thorough
training with practical and gamified elements. Overall, most companies in the energy sector
have security policies related to privacy, password complexity and expiration, and use of
multi factor authentication. Additionally, basic training is provided in attempt to prevent
phishing attempts, which most of the interview subjects report as effective.
Two of the interview subjects stated that attack simulations are used in training. In this
case, simulations refer to lectures including explanations of how attacks are performed. Such
lectures are usually followed by reflective exercises like answering questions related to the
given lecture. Although such exercises may help improve the security awareness in the orga-
nization, there is great potential for improvement of exercise efficiency in terms of employee
motivation and engagement, and subsequently increasing the learning outcome. Moreover,
most scenarios created for cybersecurity training focus on phishing attacks. However, if
the organization is to be truly prepared, widening the surface in terms of attack types is
imperative. One of the energy production companies that was interviewed has an ICT-
handbook containing policies on cybersecurity procedures and incident response plans in
addition to descriptions of previous attacks and how they were mitigated. The handbook is
used when the organization experiences new attacks that require action to be taken, not as a
training aid. This handbook could be a useful implementation that could be part of a train-
ing framework for the company and other organizations working with critical infrastructure,
as it would create a shared knowledge base for companies with similar security environments.
Preventive security measures are considered most effective, because small and medium sized
companies lack the capacity to identify and detect and mitigate attacks in real time. The
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focus has instead been on streamlining services and optimize cost efficiency; little attention
has been directed towards modernizing. On the other side, security awareness is viewed as
an essential element to strengthen the first line of defense. Greater security awareness among
employees would likely increase the organization’s detective capabilities, as employees with
higher awareness of the current threat landscape are better suited to detect cyber attacks
such as phishing. Employees are less susceptible to phishing if they are aware of the conse-
quences and able to identify certain attributes exposing the attack. Furthermore, employees
being unaware of the notion that phishing is a form of fraud, can make them feel powerless
and incapable. Medium sized companies have small IT departments with no or few employ-
ees with background in cybersecurity. These department are too small and lack of resources
results in poor detective controls. A limited understanding of information security makes it
difficult to establish a strong security culture as employees do not have sufficient knowledge
about IT and information security. However, several companies are tackling this problem
by hiring younger employees, and performing annual security awareness training followed
by a quiz to evaluate effectiveness. Other companies have decided to outsource their cy-
bersecurity responsibilities to other Norwegian or foreign companies, making it difficult to
determine how well the information is processed and secured.
Additionally, these companies have little or no idea about the internal security in the compa-
nies they outsource their security to. As mentioned previously, Norway has strict regulations
for organizations responsible for critical infrastructure. Be that as it may, it is highly dif-
ficult to be entirely compliant with these regulations, especially for smaller companies that
have few IT employees and small security budgets. For instance, organizations in the energy
sector are required to have specific roles and responsibilities designated in order to respond
to incidents and perform disaster recovery. In addition to the legal requirements placed upon
these organizations, many of them follow self imposed regulations by attempting to comply
with guidelines provided by the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM). Despite their
efforts, compliance is an ongoing project that may never be fully realized for some. Although
the security is not yet at the level many companies would like, security agencies such as NSM
and PST are quick to respond and assist these companies when they are attacked, due to
the crucial role they play in the protection of society. The energy companies also face some
unique challenges in regards to security that other organizations with operational technology
are not subject to. Contrary to other companies with OT-systems, energy companies are
required to share information produced by the OT-systems with the general public. This
means that companies in the energy sector cannot always use air-gapping to prevent unau-
thorized communication with OT-systems, creating additional security implications.
The quality of cybersecurity training in the energy sector has improved in recent years.
This can in part be attributed to NorSIS, who have been providing new training content as
well as the organizing a national security month each October. However, one of the inter-
view subjects states that even though the training has become more interesting in general,
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the participants’ interest in cybersecurity is still low. The quality of the training could be
improved by giving the participants a better understanding of what cybersecurity is, and the
potential impact weak security has on the company, or society. Furthermore, the training
should be divided into different specific topics that highlight important aspects of cyberse-
curity before introducing the participants to cyber range training. The cyber range should
mainly focus on the blue team training as this should help participants know when and how
to react to a certain threat. Moreover, this could also help participants know who they
should alert about a discovered threat. Lastly, there is a need for increased frequency of
training. Some companies only remind their employees of security issues after an attempted
attack. This is helpful when a new attack type or angle is discovered, but a more proactive
approach may be beneficial.
All interview subjects stated that the training they received was relevant and depicted an
accurate portrayal of the security issues they face. One subject mentioned that the training
content provided by external security consultants and The Norwegian Center for Information
Security is encouraging, but the national security month can be overly technical. Further-
more, although most of the training content itself is adequate, poor delivery of the material
can make the training uninteresting for some participants. By providing a cyber range plat-
form which gamifies aspects of the training, the motivation to participate in training will
likely increase. Moreover, many employees expect the systems and networks they use to be
resilient to external threats, and view security as the IT department’s responsibility. One
interview subject informed us about the importance of penetration testing as a useful tool to
raise awareness illustrating the importance of security to management. When asked about
the relevance of their training programs, one subject stated that there needs to be a basic
understanding of the security principles before training, which suggests that some of the
training does not take the employees’ previous knowledge into account. This is a missed
opportunity as employees with greater IT knowledge could be provided with more advanced
training, and vice versa. Furthermore, some IT departments are understaffed, resulting in a
decreased focus on security. It was mentioned that employees get most of their information
about security incidents from the media, and that the IT department shields their employees
from the impact of incidents, as not to worry the employees. However, ensuring that em-
ployees are aware the potential impact of cyber threats will improve their desire to adhere
to better security practices. It is clear from the interviews that low frequency of training is
an issue that could prevent many organizations from responding appropriately to new and
evolving cyber threats.
Lastly, the interview subjects were asked to elaborate on what they and their organization
would like the training program to include. Answers included the importance of security
routines and policies, scenario training with practical tasks, compliance with kraftbered-
skapsforskriften, the importance of access control, security in engineering stations, and asset
management for industrial control systems. Moreover, training scenarios could include what
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one would see and be exposed to if attacked, how to mitigate the attack, and who to alert.
This would allow participants to inform management about relevant security measures. Fur-
thermore, participants could receive training related to the importance of changing default
usernames and passwords, and how to propose appropriate security requirements to ven-
dors. Lastly, it was suggested that the training program should implement security concepts
and skills that are applicable in a personal setting, as well at work. Participants should be
taught the importance of strong security, and connect personal security measures to how
this impacts the company they work for, as this would make it more motivating to attend
training sessions.
When asked about the desire to use a training program with practical tasks in a cyber
range environment, all interview subjects responded positively. They mention that the idea
sounds like it would be fun and exiting, while simultaneously creating a better understanding
security issues. One interview subject informed us that they have requested more practical
training, specifically using scenarios in order to train and prepare for potential future attacks.
The utility and effectiveness of the training would rely however, on how well it is delivered.
The security concepts would have to be explained well and given proper context before any
practical training can take place. According to one of the interview subjects, the combination
of theory, relevance and context of the security concepts, in conjunction with the practical
aspects of using the information, is what will make the training program more useful than
alternative solutions. This would increase knowledge retention and allow participants to see
the relevance and context of their training. Furthermore, showing participants how easily
security vulnerabilities can be exploited will help them gain a greater understanding of the
potential impact of poor security habits.
4.2 Compliance with Security Policies
There are several reasons why compliance with internal security policies could differ. For
instance, difference in company size and experiences with previous data breaches could affect
the policies. Three of the subjects mentioned that it is difficult to make employees follow
instructions written in the policy. Applying technical security controls such as forcing em-
ployees to change passwords after a given period of time were more effective than written
policies alone. One of the security issues addressed in the interviews, is that employees have
left sensitive information in their working environment (i.e. home directory or desktop). The
first issue with this is that sensitive information should not be located anywhere else than
in the database it is intended to be in, according to the policy of this informants company.
The subject believes the cause of this is related to a more general problem, which is that
cybersecurity often is viewed as an obstacle for productivity.
The second issue, which the subject addresses as a much more difficult issue to tackle,
is that employees do not clean up after themselves in the virtual domain. The subject in-
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formed us that it should not be any more difficult to clean up after themselves in the virtual
world when it is expected that is done in the physical world (i.e. cleaning your desk). The
interview subject further states that productivity is viewed as more important than security
for the average employee. For example, an employee may download an application they
need without asking the IT department, if they are in a hurry. However, another interview
subject stated the opposite, specifically that employees are generally compliant with the
internal security policy, and that employees are asked to read through and understand the
policy and confirm this with a signature. The conclusion is therefore that internal security
policies are followed to a lesser extent if they affect productivity negatively, suggesting a lack
of motivation to follow them. There is also a general lack of focus on enforcing the policies.
Lastly, one subject stated that there are no policies preventing use of personal devices on
the company network. This is not uncommon, but there are inherent security issues, such
as the risk of malware spreading from personal devices to the company’s network and their
devices (Miller, Voas, & Hurlburt, 2012).
All interview subjects stated that they had internal procedures and policies regarding cyber-
security. Examples include acceptable use policies, requirements for multi-factor authentica-
tion, and privacy policies. Additionally, there are several system integrated security policies,
such as password change each month or each quarter. However, three of the participants
stated that these policies are often only brought up during the on-boarding phase when hir-
ing new employees, and are not repeated and enforced as often as they should. Only one of
the participants stated that it is not mandatory to sign and agreement with these policies.
4.3 Cybersecurity as a Shared Responsibility
Three of the interview subjects agreed when asked about the notion that there is a dichotomy
between OT and IT employees in terms of what security aspects they deem most important.
All the interview subjects agree that OT employees place greater importance on health and
safety, as well as availability of systems. On the contrary, IT employees are more invested
in the confidentiality and integrity of systems. Furthermore, many employees who work
with OT systems expressed that the rules and guidelines put in place by the IT department
in order to secure the company and its infrastructure are working against the productivity
goals of OT employees. The OT employees’ primary concern is their ability to access the
systems they need for their duties without being hindered in the process. Password policies
and access control that is built into these systems are disliked by some employees, although
they understand the importance of such protection measures. Ironically, some employees
who work with SCADA systems express that they would feel safer using a shared user ac-
count, as mistakes made in the system would be harder to attribute to a specific user when
using a shared user account. One of the companies interviewed has employed people that
work with both OT and IT. In this organization, the IT department seems to have a greater
understanding of both sides, as there is a better bridge of communication between the two.
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Overall, the divide between OT and IT has diminished over the last few years however, as
IT employees are given more responsibility and insight into the OT world and vice versa.
However, there is still a distinct difference between the two in terms of their work tasks and
responsibilities. OT employees work directly with the systems, and are responsible for per-
sonnel safety, whereas IT employees are responsible for the general security of architecture,
systems and information.
The degree to which employees feel that security is a shared responsibility varies from com-
pany to company, and person to person. Many employees view security as the IT depart-
ment’s responsibility, and feel that security measures are an annoyance that often hinders
productivity. To ensure that all employees are aware that security is a common responsibil-
ity, a campaign was started by one of the companies which was directed at managers in order
to teach them that they are responsible for the security of the organization, which was not
entirely clear previously. Furthermore, when asked if they would know how to help secure
the company, and if security measures should be implemented, the response was that security
measures are important and necessary to secure the organization, despite their hectic work
days. Again, it was stated by one interview subject that the IT department protects other
employees from security incidents. They expressed that this could reduce stress among the
employees, but that it also leads to relaxed attitudes regarding security issues.
Mixed responses were received when interview subjects were asked whether or not OT em-
ployees posses the necessary skills and knowledge required in order to actively participate
in the protection of the organization. Some interview subjects expressed that employees
did possess security skills, and provided an example where a phishing attack was discovered
and thwarted. Furthermore, employees are taught to ask the IT department if they have
any doubts regarding the legitimacy of emails. Another interview subject concurs with this
assessment, and states that employees are given extensive information about phishing, which
is a threat they have become much better at protecting against. However, most other threats
are unlikely to be detected by OT employees. Anomalies in SCADA for instance, are very
common, and employees are able to detect them by themselves, but are not equipped with
the skills to asses whether the anomaly is a caused by an error, or an external threat. They
are not used to considering the possibility that an external actor wants to harm the system.
4.4 Cybersecurity Awareness and Experiences with
Cyber Attacks
During the interviews, subjects were also asked what the most critical security threat would
be to operational technology, what attacks would have the greatest impact, and what attacks
occur most frequently. The responses ranged from phishing and ransomware, to hacking and
intrusion of critical infrastructure, and abuse of SCADA systems. Phishing occurs most
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frequently, along with ransomware, which are demanding to handle and has great poten-
tial for damage and financial losses. Furthermore, a hacker abusing SCADA systems could
potentially cause power outages in thousands of homes and businesses. Additionally, loss
of customer information and documentation of assets and systems would be critical incidents.
Three of the interview subjects stated that employees who work with OT are aware that
there can be vulnerabilities present in the systems, but they were not worried about the real-
ity of them being exploited by a threat actor. However, one subject stated that it is unlikely
that employees are aware of vulnerabilities in OT-systems, as people who use SCADA do not
worry about the possibility of the system being hacked. When asked about vulnerabilities in
SCADA systems that have been discovered and/or patched, this interview subject mentioned
an attack against a Florida water treatment facility where hackers used TeamViewer to access
the internet facing SCADA system, which did not have a firewall and was protected only with
a password used by other systems at the facility. Another subject informed us that these
systems are scanned regularly, and that vulnerabilities are discovered occasionally. Some
of the vulnerabilities are inconsequential, while others require immediate attention. The
company has service level agreements with vendors stating that the vendor is responsible for
notifying the company when a vulnerability in their product is discovered. When it comes
to SCADA systems, this is strictly enforced. However, when it comes to power stations and
programmable logical controllers (PLC) this might be less consistent, as these systems rarely
change or get updated. However, new facilities are to a larger extent designed and built with
security in mind, and importance is placed on patching and continuous updating of software.
All of the subjects have witnessed an incident caused by a cyber attack in the company
their working in at some point. Two of the companies have fallen victim to crypto-malware,
but the impact of each attack was vastly different. The third experienced a breach of com-
puters which resulted in servers being established on their infrastructure. The last interview
subject had not witnessed any major events, but had experienced one machine being infected
with malware. The impact of each attack was very different. In general, mitigation methods
that were used included formatting computers and restoring from backup, segmenting the
network, and removing malware from infected computers and servers. Furthermore, network
based intrusion detection systems (IDS) were implemented in order to prevent future at-
tacks. Most of the attacks mentioned by interview subjects can be prevented by employees
using computers and software responsibly and securely at work. Thus, it is likely that such
attacks could be prevented by raising the security awareness and developing the practical
security skills of employees. Based on the responses from interview subjects, it is reasonable
to suggest that phishing attacks leading to crypto-malware infections are the most frequently
attempted and successful attack, as well as the one with the greatest impact on the organi-
zation financially. Prevention of ransomware infection can be greatly improved by increasing
the employee’s ability to detect and report phishing attempts.
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Two of the subjects state that cybersecurity can be challenging for OT-personnel to com-
prehend, especially the terminology and IT as an infrastructure. One of the subjects further
states that he suspects this is because employees view IT as a tool-set to complete their work,
and to be used for social media and entertainment in their spare time. In essence, they have
little interest for how information technology works, and do not want to spend energy on
it in their daily lives. One of the subjects states that cybersecurity is only perceived as
difficult and perplexing if it interferes with their work or halts productivity. The problem
with terminology is a more generic problem related to general lack of interest when it comes
to learning subject concepts used in other sectors or domains. However, another subject
stated that cybersecurity is not perplexing and most of them know how information security
works and are aware of security issues. Despite this, the subject proceeded to explain that
few employees have in-depth knowledge of how cybersecurity works and how significant the
consequences can be if a major cyber incident occurs. All of the interview subjects were pos-
itive to a new and more practical training program, and argued that it could be beneficial
with training is able to concretize different topics within cybersecurity and visually represent
how a cyber attack can unfold, and what the possible consequences of the attack are. One
of the subjects thinks that this could make employees understand how certain restrictions
could prevent a potential data breach. Moreover, training frequency should increase, and it
would be beneficial to include scenarios in the training where incidents are categorized, and
participants are allowed to respond according to their internal guidelines.
4.5 Conclusion
Overall, findings from the interviews with Norwegian energy production companies suggest
that cyber security is regarded as an important focus area in the industry. Strict governmen-
tal regulation and highly competent support systems provide energy companies in Norway
with the knowledge and skills needed to protect our critical infrastructure. Additionally,
most companies in the sector aim to follow NSM’s basic security principles, which are com-
prehensive and cover aspects ranging from identification of threats and vulnerabilities, to
preventive, detective and mitigative measures. However, many organizations are not fully
compliant with regulations or NSM’s guidelines. Due to the complexity of these instructions
and the resource constraints in small companies, complete compliance is an ongoing project.
Furthermore, cybersecurity training is not always prioritized, despite yearly training being
specified in the regulation. Current training methods typically focus on lectures, with pre-
defined questions used to test the employees’ knowledge after training. This form of training
is less effective than simulations or other practical training methods, as it is less engaging
and motivating for participants than practical tasks and simulation exercises.
During the interviews, it became apparent that a more practical and interactive approach
to training is necessary in order to motivate participants, resulting in improved learning
outcome. Furthermore, since the target audience of the training has limited information se-
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curity knowledge, basic security principles should be prioritized first. Moreover, it would be
beneficial to provide the ability to increase training frequency. This is all possible by using
a cyber range where participants are given information and practical tasks. The inclusion of
gamification in the form of storytelling with progression and feedback, increasing difficulty
and a scoring system.
In conclusion, Norwegian energy companies have solid and comprehensive guidelines for
how to improve and maintain a strong cybersecurity posture. However, lack of time, finan-
cial resources, IT-personnel and practical training necessitates improvement in regards to
cybersecurity preparedness. This can be achieved by creating and implementing a training
program with the purpose of raising cybersecurity awareness and practical skills, with a fo-
cus on actively participating in the protection of the organization by being able to identify
and mitigate recurring threats. Additional training would help these companies be better
prepared for future cyber attacks. By utilizing a cyber range as a platform for employ-
ees to perform practical tasks presented in a story, participants will be more motivated to
complete training, gain a greater understanding of security issues, and have the ability to
increase frequency of training.
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Chapter 5
The Development of the OTnetic
Cyber Training Program
This section describes the design and development of the OTnetic cyber training program.
Furthermore, the tools and programs used to create OTnetic are described. OTnetic was
developed using multiple open source programs and tools, and consists of three major parts:
(1) a learning management system with training activities, (2) a customizable cyber range
with multiple virtual machines, and (3) a python program containing the narrative story
with practical challenges and a scoring system with flags.
5.1 System Requirements
This subsection describes what requirements were elicited from the interview findings and
literature review, and how they were selected. Several user stories have been created that
can be found in appendix E. These are divided into two categories: (1) software and (2)
training content.
The requirements have been sorted and prioritized using the MoSCoW prioritization model
based on what the interview subjects and the client organization viewed as important. Each
user story describes one requirement for the software or training content, which together
form the OTnetic training program. For example, user story E.3 states: "As a modera-
tor/instructor, I want to be able to customize the cyber range according to the users’ needs,
so that the training is targeted against the appropriate audience". As shown in figure 5.1,
the trainee can use any computer with web browser to access the entire training program
and cyber range remotely.
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5.2 System Design
Figure 5.1: System Architecture for the OTnetic Training Program
The OTnetic system was designed using components from multiple open-source projects,
which are described in greater detail in section 5.4. Firstly, CyTrONE was used to install
necessary dependencies, download the virtual machine images, and set up a virtual machine
with an Apache server where Moodle was installed. Secondly, CyLMS is used to convert the
training content from the YAML file in appendix C to a SCORM package, which is then
uploaded to Moodle. This training content was created based on the requirements from
section 5.1 and user stories in appendix E. Then, a cyber range based on the description file
in appendix F is instantiated using CyRIS. Lastly, a VNC connection to the cyber range was
created so the participants could access the range through the training activity in Moodle.
All the user has to do to use the system is access the URL that points to the Moodle server.
From the LMS, they are able to perform the quiz and access the cyber range through their
browser, without the need for additional software.
5.3 Training Content
The training content was developed in accordance with NSM’s recommendations for digital
security, as compliance with NSM’s guidelines was one of the requirements elicited from
the interviews, described in user story E.21. In the training program, two of NSM’s web
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pages were used as information sources. The first article is called "Råd og anbefalinger
om passord" ("Advice and recommendations for passwords") (NSM, 2019), and the other is
called "Passordanbefalinger fra Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet" ("Password reccomendations
from the Norwegian National Security Authority") (NSM, 2018). Furthermore, external
services were used to allow the user to explore password security. One of these services is
called "Have I been pwned?". This service allows users to type in their e-mail address or
password to see if the address or password has appeared in a data breach. In the OTnetic
training content, the service was used to check an example e-mail that has appeared in
several breaches. In the pre-recorded lecture, the website was shown on screen, with the
same example e-mail address. Additionally, two services called passord.net, and security.org
were used. Passord.net is a Norwegian web page where users can generate strong passwords
in the form of password phrases (Passord.net, 2021). The website was used as hint in one
of the quiz questions in the OTnetic training program, for users who were unfamiliar with
the concept of password phrases. Lastly, a service on security.org called "how secure is my
password" was used. This service allows users to input a password to see how long it would
take to crack it (Security.org, 2021). Most of the additional training content was developed
based on the researchers knowledge of cyber security.
5.4 Tools and Frameworks
5.4.1 CyTrONE
CyTrONE is an open source integrated cyber security training project created by researches
at the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST) (Beuran et al., 2017).
The training framework is designed to simplify the cyber range setup process. For this thesis
project, CyTrONE was installed using an installation script available on GitHub. The script,
which can be found in appendix D, automatically installs necessary dependencies such as
various Linux packages, pulls the CyRIS and CyLMS GitHub repositories, and downloads
a virtual machine image (CentOS 7) used by Moodle and the cyber range. Furthermore,
the script configures the Moodle virtual machine and generates SSH keys, as well creating a
virtual machine with Moodle and Apache installed.
5.4.2 CyLMS
CyLMS was used to convert OTnetic’s cyber security training content to a SCORM package,
which was uploaded to the learning management system (LMS) Moodle. SCORM, which
is an acronym for Sharable Content Object Reference Model, is widely used in learning
management systems and e-learning platforms. The CyLMS script takes a training content
file made in the YAML format, and a configuration file as the input, and creates a zip-file with
the SCORM package. Furthermore, the script can be used to set up VNC access to the cyber
range. If VNC is enabled, the script will automatically add a button in the training activity
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which opens a tab with a window into the cyber range virtual machine. This functionality
facilitates OTnetic’s cyber training approach, which is to let users perform practical tasks in
the cyber range while simultaneously receiving information and answering related questions
in the quiz accessible through Moodle.
Figure 5.2: CyLMS Training Content Conversion
(Beuran et al., 2017)
In order to convert a YAML file with training content to SCORM and upload it to the LMS,
the following command and arguments can be used, where "1" refers to the activity ID. The
configuration file contains the IP address of the Moodle VM, the Moodle content repository,
and the CyRIS cyber range directory.
$ ./cylms.py --convert-content training_content.yml --config-file
config_file.txt --add-to-lms 1
To remove a training activity, this command can be executed.
$ ./cylms.py --config-file config_file --remove-from-lms 1,ID
5.4.3 Moodle
Moodle is a free and open-source LMS used to manage user accounts and host training con-
tent. Moodle allows for the creation of a large number of users, and the administrator is
able to enroll one or more users in any number of activities. Moreover, Moodle provides
the ability to save grades for users based on their performance on completed training ac-
tivities, and issue badges upon completion of courses or individual training activities. For
the purposes testing OTnetic as an alternative to traditional cyber security training, one
module was created, with a focus on password use. The training content, which is written
in a YAML format, is provided in appendix C.
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5.4.4 CyRIS
CyRIS is the part of CyTrONE that is responsible for cyber range instantiation.
Figure 5.3: CyRIS Cyber Range Instantiation Tool
(Beuran et al., 2017)
The code in appendix F was used as a template to provide details for the cyber range instan-
tiation. The template, written in YAML format, can easily be modified in order to change
the configuration of the cyber range. In the example from appendix F, two guest machines
are created. Both virtual machines are connected to the same network, so they are able
to communicate with each other. Because the narrative story and simplified command line
requires python3 to run on the cyber range, the instantiation template specifies that python3
should be downloaded and installed with yum onto the virtual machine called "red", during
cyber range creation.
By utilizing CyRIS, cyber ranges can easily be created and destroyed with a few simple
terminal commands. Firstly, to create a cyber range with the YAML file in appendix F, the
following command can be run from the cyris folder:
main/cyris.py examples/template.yml config_file
To destroy the range, the following command is used:
main/range_cleanup.sh path_to_range config_file
5.4.5 noVNC
noVNC is a HTML VNC client that enables access to a remote computer through the web
browser without additional softwaare installed. OTnetic uses noVNC to provide trainees
with a window into the cyber range virtual machines.
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noVNC requires WebSockets support, and noVNC’s sister project websockify was used to
fulfill this requirement.
The VNC client was run with the following command in order to enable HTTPS.
./utils/launch.sh --ssl-only --cert self.pem
The SSL certificate referenced in the above command was generated with this command.
openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -nodes -out self.pem -keyout self.pem
5.4.6 Apache Guacamole
Apache Guacamole is an open-source, clientless remote desktop gateway that support VNC,
RDP and SSH (Apache Software Foundation, 2021). Guacamole allows users to access a
server through their web browser, without plugins or client software. Initially, OTnetic used
Apache Guacamole for testing purposes. The program was implemented so that external
users could access OTnetic. However, during development, the Apache server on the Moodle
virtual machine was made accessible via the internet and connected to a domain name
owned by one of the authors of the thesis. This was done to prevent an additional layer of
authentication for the end-users of the training program.
5.4.7 Training Progression
When a user is ready to start the OTnetic cyber security training program, they will open
their web browser and navigate to the Moodle server’s IP address. For the purposes of
testing, the lab experiment instructions provided participants with a link to one of our
personal domains, which forwarded the participant to the Moodle server’s IP address. This
was done for convenience, as a domain name is less intimidating for normal users to interact
with than an IP address and port. When navigating to the correct URL, the user will be
presented with the following login page.
After the user has logged in successfully, they are taken to the "activities" page. Where they
can choose to enter the activity for OTnetic’s password module. As the user in figure 5.5
has administrative privileges, they are also able to delete their own attempts. However, this
does not apply to normal users.
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Figure 5.4: OTnetic Login Page
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Figure 5.5: OTnetic Activities Page
After entering the activity, the user receives information and is able to submit answers in the
quiz illustrated in figure 5.7. In the quiz, there is a yellow button that can be used to access
the cyber range. Access to the cyber range is provided using the VNC protocol. The user can
complete practical challenges in the cyber range while answering quiz questions in Moodle.
For each challenge in the cyber range, there is an accompanying "flag". Flags are used as a
scoring system, and delivering a correct flag sets the current challenge as completed. The
user receives a point for each flag that is delivered. The cyber range and the LMS are tightly
connected, and some quiz questions will require that the user completes certain cyber range
challenges in order to answer the quiz question correctly. Next, once the user has completed
all the challenges in the cyber range, they can type "exit" to quit the Python program and
end the module. If the user has not yet finished the quiz, they may continue.
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Figure 5.6: OTnetic Cyber Range
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Finally, when the quiz is completed, the user can submit their answers and click the "exit
activity" button to display and save their results. All progress is saved to a file when the
user submits a flag, so if the user exits the cyber range before finishing all the challenges,
they may restart without losing their progress.
Figure 5.7: OTnetic Cybersecurity Quiz
5.4.8 KYPO
KYPO is an open source framework for hosting and managing a cyber range platform in
a cloud environment. KYPO is dependent on several OpenStack services to manage the
infrastructure that allows for an interactive cyber range environment.
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The main reason for considering KYPO as our solution for providing the training content
was the possibility to create, customize and simulate an entire infrastructure. Furthermore,
OpenStack provides a graphical user interface for managing different parts of the cyber
range such as virtual networks, machines instances, routers, users, etc. However, during the
project it was discovered that configuring all of the required OpenStack services to make the
KYPO framework work was too time and resource consuming. Furthermore, at the time
of writing this thesis, neither of the authors had sufficient experience with this open source
cloud framework.
5.4.9 AWS Cyber Range
The AWS cyber range is another open source project providing a bootstrap framework for
creating a cyber range using the Amazon Web Services Cloud. The AWS Cyber Range
project requires an AWS account, and use of the required services and resources in AWS
does cost money. The AWS Cyber Range was considered as a possible solution to use for
implementation OTnetic. However, the framework is made primarily for penetration testing
practice, and it was considered less suitable for the types of challenges and tasks that are
given to the target training participants for this project. Moreover, it was preferential to use
a project that was completely free of cost.
5.4.10 FBCTF
Facebook CTF was tested during development of OTnetic, but platform was abandoned in
favor of CyTrONE, as the project was no longer maintained and attempted setup resulted
in errors due to issues with the virtual machine engine used for deployment, which is not
maintained as of 2019.
5.5 Python CLI Application
As mentioned previously, CyTrONE offers access to virtual machines hosted in a sandbox
environment. These machines can be accessed using VNC and provides the users with a com-
mand line interface. Since most users have little to no experience using a terminal emulator,
a text-based CTF-like application was created. This application guided the users through a
series of challenges including, but not limited to, different password cracking techniques and
bad security practices, such as leaving sensitive information in plain text on the desktop,
and using the same password on multiple services.
The reasoning behind using a command line interface was giving the participants an op-
portunity to feel as if they were actually hacking. Additionally, it does not harm the system
if a user manages to break the application or the cyber range itself as everything can re-
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instantiated by destroying the cyber range, and executing two other scripts. The scripts
will instantiate a new cyber range and copy the newest version of the CLI-application to the
appropriate virtual machine in the cyber range.
5.5.1 Story-based Training
The users were guided through a story, where the user took the role of an adversary break-
ing into a misconfigured Raspberry Pi connected to an enterprise network. The application
provided new challenges as missions, where each mission focused on a specific aspect of good
and bad security practices related to password use.
The user worked with limited set of basic commands to complete each mission. The first
few missions provided the user with relevant commands to complete the mission, but as the
user progressed, the difficulty increased, which resulted in less assistance for each mission.
The intention behind this was to let the users get familiar with the different commands and
how they worked before using them independently. CLI can be an intimidating interface for
new and inexperienced users, resulting in a need for a beginner-level introduction to using
a CLI-based application. However, the focus was not on learning to use the command line,
but rather to complete the missions and give the training a unique touch to make it more
memorable.
5.5.2 Challenges
The challenges, referred to as missions in the application, have been carefully designed to
supplement the quiz. Furthermore, as the application does not communicate directly with
CyLMS, using the cyber range is mandatory to answer a few of the questions given in the
quiz.
Each challenge, or mission, requested the user to retrieve something of potential value (e.g.
passwords, flags, etc.). The first few challenges were considered as entry level exercises, where
the application guided the users by displaying what commands are necessary to complete the
challenge. As the user progressed through the different challenges, the application provided
less guidance and the user had to apply what they learned in the previous challenges.
5.5.3 Code Quality
The code should be of high quality, as the CLI application may be developed further. The
different components used for building the application consist classes which do not communi-
cate directly with each other to have a low degree of coupling. This will also allow for bigger
changes in the code, as well as replacing a component without breaking the application. The
application was built using the PEP8 coding standard for Python to increase the readability
for potential future developers of the application.
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5.5.4 Target Environment
The participants interacted with one of the virtual machines in the cyber range, called "red".
This virtual machine was used to communicate with another virtual machine in the cyber
range, presented as the target machine. Furthermore, CyTrONE allows for a variety of
operating systems to be installed and hosted on virtual machines instances in the cyber
range. Currently however, CentOS 7 is the only image installed in CyTrONE’s disc image
library. The training environment is almost identical to a typical home-folder in Linux with
different folders such as "Desktop", "Downloads", "Pictures" etc. However, as the majority
of the participants are from Norway, all of different the folders and files constructing the
environment are named in Norwegian.
5.5.5 Creating a New Training Module
The CLI-application takes a single JSON-file as input for managing the training content
(exercises/missions), allowed commands, training environment, users and flags. Creating a
new training module for the CLI application requires a few hours of time given that the
lecturer is familiar with JSON-format and basic IT concepts such as IP addresses, users and
file systems.
5.5.6 Attack Simulation
The CLI-application simulates a few commonly known password attacks. These attacks have
been simplified to make them more understandable for the end-users. For example, during
the process of cracking a password, one would compare hashes, which means each password
attempt will be hashed and then compared to the hash of the password being cracked. In
the CLI application, this process has been simplified so that the password attempt is being
compared to the password in plain text. Two password attacks are visualized in the cyber
range. These attacks includes a brute force attack and a dictionary attack. The brute
force attack simulation exemplifies how an adversary can crack a relatively short password
consisting of up to four letters in a short amount of time. The dictionary attack simulation
exemplifies how an adversary can use a word list to crack a password that only consists of a
few words.
5.6 Method for Evaluation of the Artifact
The evaluation phase, detailed in chapter 6, was performed after defining the requirements
and design of the artifact and completing the implementation of the OTnetic training pro-
gram. The artifact was evaluated based on predefined evaluation metrics and responses to a
questionnaire issued before and after the training. The evaluation metrics reflect the purpose




Evaluation of OTnetic was performed based on the results from the lab experiment. Hevner,
March, Park, and Ram (2004) describe five primary design evaluation methods. The five
methods are (1) observational, (2) analytical, (3) experimental, (4) testing and (5) descrip-
tive. Lab experiments fall under the third category, and is described as a method where
the artifact is studied in a controlled environment for qualities like usability. Black box
testing, which falls under the fourth category, was employed prior to conducting the lab
experiment in order to identify potential bugs that would hinder completion by the lab
experiment participants. Lab experiments as an evaluation strategy is also supported by
Venable, Pries-Heje, and Baskerville (2016), who separate design evaluation methods into
two categories: artificial and naturalistic evaluation. Furthermore, they state that artificial
evaluation strategies, such as lab experiments, simulations and theoretical arguments are
better suited for evaluating hypotheses and artifacts that are technical in nature. Moreover,
artificial evaluation strategies like lab experiments have the benefit of stronger scientific re-
liability in the form of better repeatability and falsifiability (Venable et al., 2016). Based
on these two articles, a lab experiment was found to be the most appropriate method for
evaluating the OTnetic training program. The lab experiment featured two groups of nine
participants. The OTnetic group is referred as group A, and the lecture group is referred to
as group B.
As mentioned previously, the first group (A) used OTnetic as their training program, and the
second group (B) were provided with a traditional training method used in the Norwegian
energy sector. This training was issued in the form of lecture with one-way communication,
which is a common method for training employees. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was
not be possible to hold a physical lecture. Moreover, in order to allow participants complete
training at their convenience, and to keep the lectures consistent, a pre-recorded video lec-
ture was produced in addition to the artifact, which was sent to the lecture group. The video
was uploaded to YouTube as a private video so it could be viewed by participants without
requiring them to download any files or video playback software. In order to fairly evaluate
the two training methods, the video lecture focused on the same topic, and provided the
same information as the sample training module for the cyber range training program.
The lab experiment provided insight into whether the artifact is more effective than tra-
ditional training methods for OT personnel or not. In order to evaluate the learning output
of each training method, participants were issued a questionnaire before and after partic-
ipation in their respective group’s training program. The questions in the questionnaires
were identical, with the exception of additional questions in the post-participation ques-
tionnaire pertaining to the participant’s experience with using the training program. By
comparing each participant’s post-participation questionnaire results with their respective
pre-participation results, it was possible to ascertain whether or not the program increased
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the participant’s knowledge of the chosen training topic. To assign a score to each par-
ticipant, every question in the questionnaire was assigned a point score. Questions with
multiple correct answers had one point per correct answer to the question. This means that
a participant could gain one or more points per question, depending on the questions. Ques-
tions that were qualitative in nature, such as ones pertaining to the participant’s subjective
experiences of the training, were not assigned a point score.
Participant Selection for the Lab Experiment
During the interviews performed in study, it was found that there is a general lack of cyber
security knowledge among OT-personnel, and that they do not receive cybersecurity training
more regularly than once a year at most. Based on these findings, there is little reason to
believe that a person who does not work with OT, is better or worse suited to complete
the training program than an OT-employee, as long as the participant does not work in IT.
Furthermore, the selected participants expressed that they are generally not interested in
cyber security, which aligns with the interview findings. Therefore, as they fit the profile
of the target group, people who do not work in IT or have a degree in IT, were considered
eligible to participate in the lab experiment.
The lab experiment was performed with a total of 18 participants, 9 in group A, and 9
in group B. Table 5.1 illustrates the demographics of participants in the lab experiment.
Furthermore, there was a somewhat even gender distribution, with 11 male participants,
and 7 female participants. Each participant was also asked to provide a subjective rating
of their own IT competence level on a 5-point Likert scale. As table 5.1 shows, the lab
experiment participants were on lower end of the spectrum. However, it was found that
the participant’s own assessment did not necessarily correlate with their performance during
training.
Age Gender IT Competence
19-24 25-35 36-50 50+ Male Female 1 2 3 4 5
OTnetic 2 4 1 2 7 2 3 2 3 0 1
Lecture 3 2 1 3 4 5 2 1 5 1 0
Table 5.1: Lab Experiment Participant Demographics
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Figure 5.8: Gender Distribution Per Group
Figure 5.9: Age Group Distribution Per Group
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Pilot Test
Before the lab experiment could be completed, a pilot test was performed in a controlled
environment, using students as test subjects. The primary objective of the pilot test was to
establish a standard procedure for performing the lab experiment. Furthermore, the pilot
test uncovered bugs and misspellings in the OTnetic cyber training framework that were
addressed before the final lab experiment. Moreover, the pilot test was done to ensure that
the OTnetic training program would work well when used by a participant without an IT
background. Participants were considered to not have an IT background if they do not have
an IT-oriented education or technical IT-related tasks as part of their work. In other words,
people who do not work in IT or have a degree in IT, were considered eligible to participate.
Another goal was to be able to gauge the difficulty level of the program, and identify how
long it would take to complete the entire program, which is why participants with little prior
knowledge was preferred.
During the pilot test, it was found that the average target participant, with no IT edu-
cation or IT related work tasks, used between one and two hours to complete the entire
training program. The long completion time was due, in part, to the pilot test participants
struggling with some of the more difficult tasks. However, they did not report that the
training program was too difficult, or too easy. The two pilot test participants reported that
the difficulty level was at 3 and 2 respectively, on a 5-point Likert scale.
The pilot test yielded encouraging results, and feedback was given by each participant.
Users were positive to the program, and described it as interesting and more fun alternative
to lectures. The program’s practical tasks and objectives required the user to actively par-
ticipate, and it was clear through observation that the pilot test participants were actively
engaged while using the training program. During the pilot test, some bugs were discovered.
These were fixed immediately, so the next pilot test participant would not encounter the
same bugs. Therefore, the first test user experienced more bugs than the last. However,
time spent fixing bugs was deducted from the participant’s over time usage.
Lecture Based Training in the Energy Sector
The authors of this thesis attended a cyber security preparedness exercise organized by a
cyber security consulting company. This exercise consisted of a lecture part, and a discus-
sion part where participants were able to contribute by sharing their own experiences and
challenges related to cybersecurity issues and incidents. There were about ten participants
in addition to the organizers. The participants consisted of IT professionals and managers
from different energy production companies.
As this training was directed towards IT personnel and managers dealing with security
incidents, the training content was considered too advanced for OT personnel. However, as
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this project focuses on the training delivery method, the same training model that was used
in the exercise will be applied, with more basic training content and by delivering one-way
communication exclusively.
Hypothesis
For the lab experiment, two hypotheses were defined:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): using cyber ranges as a training method is more effective and motivating
than traditional training delivery methods including lectures.
Null hypothesis (H0): there is no difference in effectiveness and motivation between the dif-
ferent training delivery methods.
Furthermore, the following null hypotheses, indicated by figure 5.10, were formulated in
order to assess whether a change of cybersecurity awareness and knowledge had occurred or
not:
1. There is no improvement of cybersecurity awareness and knowledge at T-1 compared
to T-0 among members of the intervention group
2. There is no change in cybersecurity awareness and knowledge at T-1 compared to T-0
among members of the control group
Figure 5.10: Lab Experiment T-test
Group A: OTnetic trainees





Prior to, and following the lab experiment, a questionnaire was issued to participants based
on the evaluation metrics defined in subsection 5.6.3. The evaluation metrics were derived
from the literature review and interviews performed as part of this thesis. The primary
purpose of the questionnaire was to evaluate the user’s overall experience with the training
program, the quality of the training content, changes in the participants attitudes towards
the importance of cyber security, and the knowledge they gained. The participants’ qual-
itative evaluation of the training program, in addition to the quantitative results of their
performance improvement on the questionnaire, formed the basis for the artifact evaluation.
5.6.3 Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation metrics for the training program reflect upon how well the artifact serves
its intended purpose, and how the participants perceived the training experience. For the
purposes of evaluating the training program, two main categories have been defined; software
metrics and training content metrics. The two categories have their own evaluation metrics,
some unique and some common, that together form the evaluation basis for the training
program. By diving the evaluation metrics into two categories, it is possible to identify the
efficiency of the artifact as a whole, in addition to evaluating the training content and cy-
ber range software separately. This ensures the possibility to identify whether a positive or
negative evaluation stems from issues with the practical use and quality of the cyber range
software, or from the training content that was created. As mentioned previously, partic-
ipants were asked to fill out a questionnaire before and after participation in the training
program. The pre-participation questionnaire only included questions designed to identify
the participants’ attitudes towards cybersecurity issues, motivation to comply with security
policies, and their current knowledge level of the security concepts in the training content.
The post-participation questionnaire contained both knowledge, motivation and security at-
titude questions, in addition to questions regarding usability of the training delivery method
and relevance of the training content they were given.
According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010), the quantitative analysis of an intervention
should be supported by qualitative evaluation techniques, as qualitative approaches provide
a depth to the evaluation that cannot be achieved by using quantitative methods exclusively.
Free-text data from the second questionnaire was used for this purpose, with the aim of re-
ceiving information regarding why the training program influenced security knowledge and
attitudes, and if the program itself was motivating, engaging, and easy to use. Furthermore,
the qualitative questions on the questionnaire allow for comparison between the training
program and alternative training approaches as delivery methods for the training content.
Thus, it is possible to discern if motivation to change security related behavior is connected
to the delivery method of the training content. Moreover, the participants’ experience with
the training program could negatively affect their motivation and knowledge acquisition.
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This could be caused by usability issues with the training program, which is caused by the
program itself, instead of the training approach.
Figure 5.11: Evaluation Metrics for OTnetic
Figure 5.11 illustrates the metrics which have been chosen for evaluating the quality of
the software and the training content respectively. These metrics are described further in
appendix G.
5.6.4 Evaluation of Data Quality
In order to ensure a certain quality related to the data collected from the lab experiment
and the interviews, a set of requirements were created. These requirements ensure that data
collected from the lab experiment is suitable for use in future analysis. The requirements were
selected based on Pipino, Lee, and Wang’s (2002) suggestions for data quality dimensions,
where the metrics relevant for this project were selected. The following requirements were
established to ensure high quality regarding data collected during this project.
1. Accuracy: The collected data must be accurate.
2. Relevancy: The collected data must meet the requirements for the intended use.
3. Completeness: The data should not have missing values or miss data records.
4. Timeliness: The collected data should be up to date.
5. Consistency: The collected data should have the data format as expected and can be




This chapter presents the results gathered from the lab experiment described in section 5.6.1.
The results were gathered from the questionnaire that was issued to each participant before
and after completing their training sessions. The results consist of a quantitative part, and
a qualitative part. As mentioned in chapter 3, the questionnaire questions were assigned
a point score in order to evaluate the increase in knowledge per group. The two groups
are referred to as group A and group B. Group A received the training program developed
during this project, called OTnetic. Group B received the pre-recorded video lecture, also
produced as part of this project. Both groups received the same information, and the same
questions in the lab experiment questionnaires.
6.1 Quantitative Evaluation
This section presents the quantitative results from the lab experiment. This includes the
results from questions that were given a point score. Section 6.2 presents the qualitative
results, which includes the participants’ subjective evaluation of the training program.
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Figure 6.1: Knowledge Improvement Per Participant
Figure 6.1 illustrates the score achieved by each participant before and after training, as well
as their improvement. The IDs ranging from one to nine belong to group A (OTnetic), while
IDs ranging from 11 to 18 belong to group B (lecture).
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Figure 6.2: Performance Comparison Before and After Training for Group A
Figure 6.3: Performance Comparison Before and After Training for Group B
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the mean score per question answered by each group before and
after training was provided. The blue marks the performance before the training, while the
red marks the performance after the training. As the figures illustrates, both of the training
approaches led to a higher mean score for some of the questions.
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Figure 6.4: Comparing Mean Performance of Each Group Before Training
Figure 6.5: Comparing Mean Performance of Each Group After Training
Figure 6.4 and 6.5 compare the mean score for each group before and after the performing
the training. These figures are quite similar to figure 6.2 and 6.3, but instead of showing
performance increase before and after training they are directly comparing the performance
between the two groups. As figure 6.4 shows, group A had more correct answers than group
B in the questionnaire for establishing baseline knowledge. Furthermore, we can see that
there was a small improvement for both groups after the training.
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6.1.1 Paired Sample T-Test
A paired t-test was employed in order to compare mean performance between group A and B.
This form of test was performed to measure the effectiveness of the OTnetic training program
and compare it with lecture-based training. As mentioned in section 5.6.2, a pre-test was
conducted in order to establish a baseline of the participants’ cybersecurity knowledge. After
completing the training, the participants took a post-test questionnaire in order to provide
a point of comparison that could be used to establish the participants’ knowledge increase.
The knowledge increase was determined by calculating the difference of the post-test score
from the pre-test score of each participant. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
was one of the tools used to analyse the results from the t-test. The results from the t-test
were included in the thesis as they supported the findings from the non-parametric test.
However, a t-test should be conducted with a larger sample size as this is a pre-requisite
for this type of statistical test. Additionally, the data used for the test should be normally
distributed. This test is included, despite the low sample size, as it provided results that
supported the results from the Mann Whitney U test.
The Paired Samples t-test compares the means of two measurements taken from the same
individual, object, or related units (Kent State University, 2021). These "paired" measure-
ments can represent things like: A measurement taken at two different times (e.g., pre-test
and post-test score with an intervention administered between the two time points). A
paired samples t-test should be conducted using data that is normally distributed. For this
thesis however, it was unknown if the data was normally distributed due to the sample size.
Regardless, it was decided to include this test as this thesis is exploratory, and the test could
reveal if the training had an effect if combined with other tests that are able to account for
the potential lack of normal distribution. A non-parametric test has been conducted as well,
as this will account for the limitations of the paired sample t-test. The non-parametric test,
called a Mann Whitney U test, is described in section 6.1.2.
Figure 6.6: Results from T-Test Analysis with Both Groups
Figure 6.6 describes the mean performance for both groups before and after training, in
addition to the standard deviation. Furthermore, a difference in mean performance between
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the pre-test and the post-test may indicates that the training had an effect on the perfor-
mance. The standard deviation reveals how close the participants were to the mean score of
its own group, indicating how consistent the increase or decrease in performance was across
the entire group.
6.1.2 Mann Whitney U Test
In addition to the T-test, a non-parametric test called the Mann Whitney U test was per-
formed. A non-parametric test was performed due to the small sample size and data set
used does not assume normal distribution. The test calculation used a two-tailed test with
a significance level of α 0.1. The test calculated a P-value of 0.07632 for the results after
training. Since the P-value is greater than α, H0 is rejected. To summarize, the test shows
that hypothesis 1, which states that using cyber ranges as a training delivery method is more
effective and motivating than traditional training methods, is supported. The three figures
below present the results from running the three different tests in figure 5.6.1. Figure 6.8
shows the median test scores of group A and B after training. Figure 6.7 shows the median
test scores of group A and B before training.
Figure 6.7: Two Sample Mann Whitney U Test for Group A and B Before Training
Figure 6.8: Two Sample Mann Whitney U Test for Group A and B After Training
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6.2 Qualitative Evaluation
As mentioned previously, each participant was asked to evaluate the training they received
in terms of relevance, difficulty, motivation, and how efficient the program was at teaching
cyber security. Moreover, every participant was asked to provide some feedback regarding
what the participant liked about the training they received.
Figure 6.9: Comparing Feedback from Groups A and B
Figure 6.9 describes the feedback provided by both groups. A potential limitation with this
feedback is that it is based on the participants’ subjective opinion. However, the participants’
personal experiences are important to consider as they may reveal deficits in the training





This chapter provides discussions and reflections regarding the results presented in the pre-
vious chapter. Furthermore, the thesis’ contribution to research and practice is illustrated,
and limitations of the study are presented.
This thesis has examined various training methods and open source programs that can be
used create a cyber range platform. As mentioned in section 3.1, the activities formulated by
Peffers et al. (2007) were used during the design and development of the artifact. OTnetic
was developed and evaluated based on the needs and requirements of organizations in energy
sector, and is well suited for training in such organizations. The need for additional cyber
security training was identified in the interviews performed in the thesis, as well as Giuliano
and Formicola’s (2019) findings presented in the literature review. Based on the results of
this study, it is worth exploring cyber range based training further. As both training meth-
ods resulted in better scores for all of the participants in the lab experiment, there is reason
to believe that a combination of the methods may be ideal. Therefore, further development
of OTnetic will likely include short videos introducing the training content as part of the
training program. This solution would reduce the need for text-based explanations of the
training topics.
7.1 Limitations
As mentioned previously, in this project, only one round of the DSR cycle was performed
due to time constraints. Ideally, several more iterations of the cycle would be completed in
order to continuously improve the artifact with feedback from the users after each completed
cycle. However, further research and development is expected. Plans and ideas for further
development are outlined and described in section 7.4.
Additionally, limitations related to the COVID-19 pandemic need to be considered. Due
to the current pandemic, it was not possible to perform in-person interviews. Moreover, it
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was not possible to perform the lab experiment in person, without taking the necessary pre-
cautions needed to ensure the safety of the participants and the lab experiment instructors.
The solution to this issue was to perform the interviews online, and to allow lab experiment
participants to perform the training program online, from their homes. Furthermore, the
control group received a pre-recorded video lecture, instead of a classroom lecture, which
may be beneficial. As mentioned in the literature review, cues such as reactions of others,
speaker credibility and the attractiveness of the speaker can affect the trainee’s perception
of the lecture (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). These factors should be alleviated by the
use of a video lecture where the speaker is unknown and the trainee is watching the lec-
ture alone. Despite being a limitation, the video lecture and online lab experiment offers
increased flexibility to participants, and is more consistent in cases where participants may
need to complete the lecture on different days. Moreover, this type of training is likely to
become increasingly popular, as an increase in working from home is likely to persist as a
result of a shift in work culture caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Another potential limitation is that it may be difficult to get accurate and elaborate answers
to interview questions, due the sensitive nature of the intended questions. Organizations
may be sceptical when it comes to providing students with information, especially as it re-
lates to their internal security. However, this issue was mitigated by signing a non disclosure
agreement with the client organization stating that power sensitive information would not be
included in the thesis, as well as providing an assurance of anonymity to interview subjects
and their respective organizations.
As the study was conducted using a small sample size, the results may be caused by other
factors. Since a single participant’s score accounts for a ninth of the calculated mean, one
participant can potentially have a drastic impact on the mean performance of the entire
group. Both the paired samples T-Test and the Mann Whitney U test have a statistical
significance. There is reason to believe that the differences in increased knowledge in the
two the groups are caused by the treatment they received.
Another potential limitation regarding the lab experiment is the difference in time duration
related to the two training methods. The participants using the OTnetic training framework
trained for about an hour or longer, while the video only lasted about twenty minutes. De-
spite the fact that this makes for a difficult comparison, research suggests that the process of
active learning is in itself more time-consuming than participating in a meeting or a lecture.
However, if the objective is to give the participant an opportunity to understand and master
the information, active learning is more effective than lectures and classroom-exercises such
as tabletop discussions (Hackathorn, Solomon, Blankmeyer, Tennial, & Garczynski, 2011).
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Lastly, as this project only includes six interviews, which is a small sample size, there is
a limitation of whether or not the viewpoints and information gathered from interviews pro-
vided a comprehensive understanding of the security situation for the entire energy sector.
7.2 Analysis of the Results
The hypothesis for this thesis states that using cyber ranges as a training delivery method is
more effective and motivating than traditional training delivery methods, such as lectures.
This hypothesis is supported by the results presented in the previous chapter. However, the
differences in learning output were smaller than expected. This could be explained, in part,
by the small sample size of the lab experiment. Moreover, the fact that group B (lecture)
had lower pre-training test scores, means that they had more room for improvement than
group A (OTnetic). However, a better score on the pre-test may suggest that participants
in this group are better equipped to learn new information security concepts. As group B
had a lower initial score than group A, they had more potential points to gain in the post-
training scores. Furthermore, the standard deviation from the T-test presented in figure
6.6 suggests that group A had a more consistent performance increase as the mean score
increased and the standard deviation decreased after the training. However, we are unable
to determine if this decrease in the standard deviation for group A is coincidental or caused
by the treatment. These two parameters suggests that all the participants in group A had
a score closer to the mean score of the group after the training. For group B however, the
standard deviation increased after the training suggesting that the increase in performance
may not be as consistent for the entire group.
The lab experiment conducted in this thesis was formed in accordance with the UCIT model
presented by Puhakainen and Siponen (2010), which was described in the literature review.
The process starts with determination of the instructional task, which was created in OT-
netic prior to the lab experiment. Then, the trainee’s current state was diagnosed with
the questionnaire. After delivering the training, the trainee was reassessed with the second
questionnaire, and the success of the artifact was diagnosed. Furthermore, Puhakainen and
Siponen (2010) also mentioned that the training content should be personally relevant for
the learner, as motivation is a prerequisite for cognitive processing. This was taken into
account when developing the training content, as it was also mentioned in one of the inter-
views. Additionally, it was identified in the literature review that employees often struggle
to understand the consequences of bad security (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011). OTnetic
attempts to demonstrate the consequences of poor password habits by allowing trainees to
perform attacks that show how easily a hacker can crack weak passwords. This knowledge
is applicable in the trainee’s personal and work life.
The results show that all lab experiment participants learned something new, as all of them
performed better on the post-training test. This reveals that both training methods will
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provide untrained employees with new knowledge, unless the participants dedicated their
own spare time learning more about password security, which is unlikely considering that
the post-test was provided the next day. However, OTnetic allows trainees to perform prac-
tical tasks and active learning, which can be more effective at creating long-term knowledge.
Moreover, OTnetic may be suited for more difficult training content or specific topics. As
discussed previously, active learning is better for learning specific topics with a limited scope.
Furthermore, more advanced topics than the one presented in this thesis may be present it-
self as better use case for OTnetic, as difficult topics would benefit more from active training
and practical tasks.
As mentioned in section 2.2.2, Beuran et al. (2017) have established a set of five require-
ments that make an effective cyber security training program. The first three requirements
are fulfilled by the OTnetic training program. Firstly, OTnetic contains appropriate train-
ing content for the target audience in terms of knowledge and ability levels. Secondly, the
training program contains training content corresponding with the skills the program aims
to develop. Lastly, it uses hands-on activities and exercises to make the training more mem-
orable and realistic. The final two requirements of reaching a large audience to generalize
the training and have sufficient cost contra performance characteristics to make the program
sustainable in the long term, where not fulfilled as the cost-efficiency has not been tested
and the training content is tailored for a specific target audience.
The cyber range is currently accessible through a command line interface. Utilizing this
interface requires an introduction, as some participants found it to be hard to use and un-
derstand. This is because many users have never been required to interact with a terminal
emulator before. However, many of the participants reported that using this type of in-
terface was an overall positive experience, and that they learned a great deal from using
it. Moreover, the use of a terminal made the training feel like a game according to some
participants. Additionally, most of the participants who used OTnetic reported that the
program was motivating, as opposed to the lecture group, which reported less interest in
the training. The results from the lab experiment indicate that a short video about the
topic can be beneficial in combination with the OTnetic training program. OTnetic could be
modified to include short video introductions explaining topics before the practical session
in the range, which would require less text to be presented to the trainee. A video on the
use and benefits of the terminal may also presented to trainees in future, in order to make
the program more approachable. Additionally, training with OTnetic may be better suited
for learning more difficult material that is hard to teach in a lecture, or requires the trainee
to learn a concept that is practical in nature. As table 5.1 illustrates, all the participants in
the lab experiment were asked to evaluate their own IT competence. However, it was found
that the participants’ own assessment of their IT knowledge did not correlate with their test
scores. The users that claimed higher competence did not score any better than the users
that claimed to be on the lower end of the spectrum.
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Overall, the group that performed the OTnetic training program provided much more pos-
itive feedback when asked what they thought was positive and negative about the training
they received. Participants from group A reported that they have become more aware of
cyber security issues and the importance of secure password habits, how to create strong
passwords that easy to remember, the importance of multi-factor authentication, and how to
identify phishing attempts. Moreover, these participants felt that the training was clear and
logical. Unlike the lecture group participants, OTnetic’s users reported that the training was
fun, engaging and motivating. The combination of quiz questions and practical tasks with a
flag based scoring system was very motivating, according to the participants. They also liked
being able to execute commands in a Linux system, and the ability to see examples of how
hackers are able to crack passwords. Furthermore, one participant stated that the training
program was challenging enough that it was not boring to perform, and that it reminded
them of a text-based adventure game. These results align well with the findings from the
literature review (2.2.2), as elements from gamification have proven to increase motivation
if implemented properly according to Paton and Jackson (2002). The utility of gamification
is further supported by Adams and Makramalla’s (2015) research which is presented in the
literature review. Furthermore, the feedback from group A aligns well with the evaluation
metrics proposed for the artifact in figure 5.11.
Despite the participants in the lecture group also improving their knowledge of password
security from training, they reported that the passive learning style provided by the lecture
made it difficult to remember the training content. Furthermore, some participants men-
tioned that the video was too long, which made them lose focus and motivation to complete
the training. Despite participants in Group A spending one to two hours on their training,
none of them reported that the training session was too long. In comparison, the video lec-
ture presented to group B was about twenty minutes long in total. As figure 6.9 illustrates,
when asked how motivating the training method was, group B rated their training at an
average of 3,4 on a scale from one to five. Group A rated their motivation at an average
of 4,1. The difference in motivation between the two groups may be explained by the pres-
ence of gamification elements in the OTnetic training framework, which is supported by the
literature described in section 2.2.2. Furthermore, regarding the difficulty of the received
training method, group A had a mean score of 3, while group B had a mean score of 2,4,
suggesting that the OTnetic training framework was a bit more difficult, while still being
more motivating. This may suggest that using the cyber range and quiz is more fun than
watching a video lecture. One possible explanation for this is the use of gamification in
the OTnetic training program. As found in the literature review, gamification makes the
learning experience more fun for participants, increases motivation, and produces a greater
learning outcome (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). This is further supported by the literature
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review finding that applying game-design elements and game principles to the training pro-
cess will enrich the learning experience and motivate trainees. However, these results are
based on the participants subjective opinion. In summary, although both groups did show
improved knowledge after completing their training, group A showed much higher interest
and engagement in their training, and found their training program to be more motivating
overall, which according to Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) is a prerequisite for cognitive
processing.
7.3 Implications for Research
This research has focused on OT-personnel in the Norwegian sector, as the client organi-
zation identified a need for new methods to provide additional cyber security training for
this group. OT-personnel work with critical technology, and they have a great responsibility
to aid in the organizations ability to maintain a strong cyber security posture. However,
by conducting interviews with energy companies, it was found that there is a lack of gen-
eral IT and basic security knowledge among these employees. Solid password security and
habits are essential to protect systems and networks. Therefore, OTnetic was developed with
module focusing on password security initially. A lab experiment was conducted to test the
efficacy of OTnetic. In order to accurately evaluate the training program developed during
this thesis. Two hypotheses were formulated. Hypothesis 1 states that using cyber ranges
as a training delivery method is more effective and motivating than traditional training de-
livery methods including lectures. A null hypothesis was also formulated, which states that
there is no difference in effectiveness and motivation between the different training methods.
Further research should be done in order to identify the benefit of cyber range training for
other roles and domains. Additionally, further research could be done to examine whether
or not this type of training is effective at creating long-lasting or tacit knowledge. Further-
more, it would be beneficial to conduct a large-scale lab experiment with a greater number
of participants in order to solidify the validity of results, and explore whether or not the
difference in knowledge increase is greater between the two groups when a larger sample size
is used. Additional groups could also be used to ascertain the effectiveness of a wider variety
of training methods compared to OTnetic.
The research presented in this thesis can be of great value to companies in the Norwe-
gian energy sector. The results from the lab experiment indicate that a gamified approach
could be an effective alternative to current training methods to increase knowledge retention.
Furthermore, the feedback suggests that some of the participants had a more positive atti-
tude towards information security after the training. Moreover, the thesis has contributed to
the academic literature landscape by presenting a viable alternative to traditional training
methods in the form of cyber range training, which can be used to present new information
and allow the trainees to develop practical skills. These skills are valuable assets an employee
can use to contribute their organizations cybersecurity posture. Furthermore, the research
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has identified that cyber range training may be a more motivating training method than
lectures. Additionally, this thesis has revealed the issue of lacking cyber security knowledge
and skills among OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector, and shown that it is pos-
sible to create training that elicits internal motivation in trainees that are not necessarily
interested in information technology.
Further research on the efficacy of cyber ranges should be conducted in order to better es-
tablish the learning benefits of this training method. It would also be beneficial to conduct
a lab experiment in greater scale, with more participants and additional training modules.
The research presented in this thesis suggests that cyber range training can be a useful tool
to teach cyber security to OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector. However, it would
be interesting to conduct further research that investigates the applicability of cyber range
training in other sectors and roles. Moreover, a graphical interface could be more suitable to
training employees who do not have a background in IT, as the CLI interface was unfamiliar
to some of the lab experiment participants.
As stated in the introduction in chapter 3 the design science research approach has gained
popularity over the last years. Furthermore, this approach was well suited for answering
the thesis’ research questions, and developing and evaluating an artifact with a focus on
increasing motivation and developing practical skills. We suggest that DSR could be an ef-
fective approach for software development where research is in focus, given that the artifact
requirements are dependant on the target audience. Firstly, the DSRM employs a similar
incremental model as current software development methods. Secondly, the artifact pro-
duced as result of the project would be grounded in previous research given that a literature
review has been conducted. Lastly, the results from the project may contribute to other
organizations operating in the same domain, as well as different research communities. We
believe the thesis has contributed in closing the research gap identified earlier.
7.4 Implications for Practice
Further development of the training content provided by the OTnetic training platform will
include adding more graphical content such as videos and images, more CPS-related content
to increase the relevance for OT-personnel, and allowing participants to attack each other
in real-time. As the latter can be challenging to implement, an alternative can be a virtual
machine instance acting as the defending side, as this will illustrate how one can halt or
thwart an ongoing attack.
Furthermore, additional elements related to gamification can be implemented. OTnetic’s
learning management system, Moodle, allows instructors to create badges. These badges
can be used as a certificate of completion, as they can be earned by completing a single
activity, an entire course including multiple activities. Badges will give the participants a
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feeling of mastery, as they will earn more badges when progressing and completing additional
courses. Other ways to further gamify the training can be to make the program more visual
by introducing a graphical interface, a leaderboard where users can compete for the best
score, and activating chat functionality within Moodle that facilitates better communication
among users.
Software-wise, further development will include improvements and automation related to
cyber range instantiation and more simulated attacks illustrating the mechanisms in the
attack and how it may impact an organization. Additionally, the possibility to work on
other operating systems than Linux CentOS 7 can be implemented, as a terminal emula-
tor can be intimidating to users without a background in IT. It is possible to add other
operating systems in the form of disc images to CyTrONE’s disc image library, such as Win-
dows. Lastly, more training modules should be developed in order to provide trainees with
a greater amount of cyber security training content. As password security was the main
focus during this development cycle, only one training activity was created in Moodle. In
future iterations, it would be beneficial to create courses containing several smaller training
activities that could performed in sequence with increasingly difficult activities.
Cyber ranges are predominantly used to teach cyber security concepts to people who work
with or study cyber security. However, this thesis suggests that cyber ranges may be suit-
able as a general teaching tool for people without an interest in cyber security. Moreover,
OTnetic’s focus on active learning has been shown to be effective, and may be beneficial
for organizations to explore alternative training methods that incorporate active learning to




This chapter presents conclusions based on the results presented and discussed in the previous
two chapters. The goal of this thesis was to answer the following two research questions:
• How can cyber ranges be utilized as a cyber security training tool for OT-employees
in the energy sector?
• What limitations exist in current practical training exercises and programs related to
cybersecurity preparedness in enterprises in the Norwegian energy sector?
In order to answer these questions, a training program for improving cyber security pre-
paredness in the Norwegian energy sector called OTnetic was developed. The program was
tested against a pre-recorded video lecture in order to evaluate its efficacy based on require-
ments elicited from the interviews that were conducted. OTnetic is a cyber security training
program that utilizes a cyber range that allows trainees to learn about, and explore cyber-
security concepts by performing practical tasks and answering related questions.
The results from the lab experiment indicate that both the OTnetic training program and
lecture-based training had a positive effect on learning outcome. The group using OTnetic
had slightly better results on the post-test and reported that the learning experience was
both motivating and engaging. Furthermore, participants responded more positively overall
to this form of training, in contrast to the lecture-based training method, which received
some positive and negative feedback. However, as stated in chapter 7, the limited sample
size made the results from the lab experiment non-generalizable for the population. Addi-
tionally, due to time constraints, the participants for the lab experiment were not exclusively
OT personnel working for the Norwegian energy sector. However, these participants had no
background in IT, and were deemed sufficient candidates to participate in the lab experiment.
As stated in chapter 7, OTnetic was proven to be effective at training people with lim-
ited cyber security knowledge. The results of the thesis indicate that OTnetic is able to
create a greater knowledge output than lectures. These findings are an important discovery,
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as they expose the value of using cyber range based training for teaching cyber security to
OT-personnel, which is not commonly used today. However, due to the limitations discussed
in chapter 7, more research would be beneficial in order to conclude whether OTnetic is well
suited for providing cyber security training for OT personnel in the Norwegian energy sector.
To review, the results of this thesis indicates that cyber range based training can be an
efficient and motivating method to teach OT-personnel in the Norwegian energy sector cy-
ber security concepts. Furthermore, OTnetic outperforms lecture-based training when tested
on two groups of participants lacking knowledge of cyber security and information technol-
ogy. Participants using OTnetic also report greater motivation to complete training than the
lecture group. This is likely due to practical nature of the training program, and inclusion
of elements from game design. This facilitates active learning, which may be beneficial when
aiming to produce long-term knowledge. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, there
is gap, both in current research on effective cyber security training in the energy sector, and
in the training currently given to these employees. We believe OTnetic can be a solution
well suited to alleviate this research gap.
8.1 Reflection
During this thesis project, we have had the opportunity to get familiar with the design sci-
ence research (DSR) approach. DSR allows for the creation of an artifact with purpose of
solving the problem identified earlier in the same project. Therefore, this project has allowed
us to identify and investigate the problem of training in the Norwegian energy sector, and
create a solution to tackle this problem. Furthermore, as DSR utilizes both qualitative and
quantitative methods for requirement elicitation and evaluation, we have gained valuable
knowledge and experience tied to conducting interviews and lab experiments.
Additionally, we have gained great insight into the state of cybersecurity in critical in-
frastructure in Norway, what threats they face, and how training is conducted. Moreover,
the motivational advantages of gamification have become increasingly apparent, which will
aid us in the future development of OTnetic. Furthermore, we have had the opportunity
to explore a variety of open source projects and tools. Setting up, modifying and testing
these tools and programs has been a technical challenge from which we have gained valuable
experience. Lastly, as the thesis was written in LATEX, we have learned a lot about this
language and the value it provides.
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Appendix A
Interview Guide for OT-personnel in
the Norwegian Energy Sector
(English)
The purpose of this interview is to gain a better understanding of OT-personnel’s attitude
towards information security, and establish what kind of training they receive in regards to
cybersecurity. Before we begin, we would like to inform you that everything you say will not
be tied to your name. Furthermore, if some of the questions are difficult to answer without
sharing sensitive information, please let us know so we can avoid this.
A.1 Current Status of Training
1. Can you tell me what type of training OT-personnel receive in regards to cybersecurity?
2. How do think this training can be improved?
3. Do you feel like these training programs accurately reflect relevant cybersecurity issues?
4. Do you know if the company you work for has internal security policies for OT-systems
or information security? (e.g. password rules, acceptable use policy)?
5. To what degree do you think other employees in the company comply with these rules
and policies?
A.2 Attitudes Towards Information Security
Some people would argue that there is a gap between those who work with IT and OT, and
what they are concerned with in regards to security, safety and work assignments.
1. Do you think your colleagues would agree with this statement?
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2. Do you think employees not working with IT can affect the security level in your
organization? Do you think most employees view security as a shared responsibility?
3. Do you think that employees in your organization have the knowledge and skills to
assist in the work of securing the organization (e.g. detect phishing emails and errors
in control systems/SCADA)?
4. Do you think that employees are aware that vulnerabilities may exist in operational
systems that can be exploited by threat actors? Do you know if such vulnerabilities
have been discovered and patched?
5. What do you think is the most critical threat in the "OT-world"? What kind of cyber
attack do you believe would have the biggest impact on your organization and society?
6. Have you, or someone you know, experienced a security incident in your organization?
How was this incident handled?
A.3 Opinions On Development of a New Training Pro-
gram
During this master thesis, we will develop a training program made specifically for employees
working with OT in the energy sector. To achieve the desired result, we need some help
from the target audience. The product will most likely be made in the form of a framework
or application built on principles of simulation and gamification, with various tasks and
challenges.
1. Do you think other employees in the company you work for find IT and cybersecurity
difficult and confusing?
2. How do you feel about completing a training program where you receive practical
challenges and get to see cybersecurity from both sides (defense/attack)? Do you
think other employees would be positive to this concept?
3. Is there anything specific you would like to learn more about in regards to cybersecurity,
or something you think there is a need for in your company or the sector?
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Appendix B
Interview Guide for Security
Consulting Company (English)
B.1 Current Status of Training
1. Can you tell me about how cyber security training is given in the companies you work
with?
2. What kind of training do you give to new employees who work with cybersecurity?
3. Does the company have a clear plans for roles and and responsibility in the occurrence
of a cyber security related incident?
4. Do you feel like these training programs make a noticeable difference in terms of knowl-
edge and preparedness?
5. Do you feel like these training programs left anything in regard to awareness about
security related issues or technical preparedness?
6. Does NC-Spectrum offer any form of training for cyber security for your clients?
7. what kind of training have you experienced to be the most cost effective?
B.2 Security Requirements in the Energy Sector
1. Are there any specific or unique security requirements that are common for companies
in the energy sector? (or in other critical infrastructure?)
2. Are there any requirements that differ, or do they mostly face the same security chal-
lenges?
3. Do these companies use substantially more resources on cybersecurity than other com-
panies?
85
4. Can you tell me more about security issues or security incidents that are unique for
companies in the energy sector? (i.e. in terms of operating cyber physical systems,
responsibility for security, influence on society etc.)
5. Do you consider these companies as attractive targets for cyber criminals or other
malicious actors?
B.3 Attack Simulation
1. What type of attacks are most common in your company or your clients companies?
What kinds of attacks have the greatest impact?
2. Do you utilize cyber ranges or other forms of red/blue team training (such as penetra-
tion testing)?
3. Do you think that simulating specific attack types in a controlled environment for
security professionals in their company could improve the abilities of the participants?
(make them better prepared for such attacks in a realistic setting)
4. What do you think would be challenging with such a training program?
5. what do you think would be beneficial with implementing such a training program?
B.4 Use of Existing Training Frameworks
1. Do you use any existing frameworks for training that are relevant for cyber security?
(If yes: what?)
2. How have you customized these frameworks to fit your unique needs and security
requirements?
3. What are your current focus areas in the frameworks and programs you use? (i.e.




Figure C.1: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 1
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Figure C.2: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 2
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Figure C.3: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 3
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Figure C.4: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 4
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Figure C.5: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 5
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Figure C.6: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 6
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Figure C.7: Cyber Range Quiz YAML 7
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Figure D.1: CyTrONE Installation Script 1
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Figure D.2: CyTrONE Installation Script 2
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Figure D.3: CyTrONE Installation Script 3
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Priority: 1 - Must have
User story:
As a training participant, I want to be able to take the role of an adversary
as well as a defender, so I can understand more of what is happening on
both sides of a cyber attack.
Description:
The software will consist of two parts; (1) a cyber range with practical
tasks and challenges, and (2) a part where information is provided and
questions are asked in order for the participant to reflect on what they have




Given that the user is participating in the training program.
When the participant is using the cyber range.
Then the participant should either attack or defend a given virtual machine
instance depending on the module.
Table E.1: User Story 1-S
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ID: 2-S
Priority: 2 - Must have
User story:
As a user, I want to be able to access the system remotely, so training can
be performed at any time during the day.
Description: It must be possible for users to access the training program remotely.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that the user is working from home.
When the user needs to use the training program.
Then the user should be able to access the training program.
Table E.2: User Story 2-S
ID: 3-S
Priority: 3 - Must have
User story:
As a moderator/instructor, I want to be able to customize the cyber range
according to the users’ needs, so that the training is targeted against the
appropriate audience.
Description:
Cyber range creation and destruction must be possible by utilizing a script
and a template specifying the requirements for the cyber range.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that the cyber range is part of the training module.
When the instructor launches a new cyber range instance.
Then the instructor must be able to customize it according to the module
requirements.
Table E.3: User Story 3-S
ID: 4-S
Priority: 4 - Must have
User story:
As an administrator/moderator, I want to be able to manage multiple
users and enroll them in different courses, so that they receive training
relevant for their situation and knowledge level.
Description:
Cyber range creation and destruction must be possible by utilizing a script
and a template specifying the requirements for the cyber range.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that there are several users from different organizations with
different knowledge and experiences.
When the users are using the training program.
Then they should receive training that is most relevant for their needs.
Table E.4: User Story 4-S
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ID: 5-S
Priority: 5 - Must have
User story:
As a participant, I want to be able to perform the training at any time of
the day, so that I can complete my critical work before training.
Description:




Given that a user has a busy day at work.
When the user is supposed to perform training.
Then the user should be able to perform the training at a convenient time.
Table E.5: User Story 5-S
ID: 6-S
Priority: 6 - Must have
User story:
As a moderator/instructor, I want to be able to create new training
modules following a standard format, so that I do not have to know the
system intimately to create more training content.
Description:
It should be possible to create new training modules with unique training
material and practical challenges.
Module creation should follow a standard format, such as yaml.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that there is a need for new training content.
When the instructor creates new training content.
Then the format of the training content should follow a standard format
to save time.
Table E.6: User Story 6-S
ID: 7-S
Priority: 7 - Should have
User story:
As a training participant, I want to be able to see my progress and how
well I am doing compared to the other training participants, so that I can
get better idea of what I need to improve.
As an instructor, I want to be able to see how well the training
participants are doing, so that I can get a better idea of how effective the
training is and if a training module needs to be improved/revised.
Description:
The training program will save the participant’s progress so they can
continue if an error occurs.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that a user has a busy day at work.
When the user is supposed to perform training.
Then the user should be able to perform the training at a convenient time.
Table E.7: User Story 7-S
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ID: 8-S
Priority: 8 - Should have
User story:
As an instructor, I want the user to perform the training using a single
solution, so that I do not have to account for multiple solutions
when creating and delivering the training content.
Description:
The provided training solution should be a single solution that easily
deployable without depending on external frameworks.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that a user is supposed to use OTnetic for cyber training.
When they are training on a given module.
Then the module should not be dependent on other frameworks that are
not included in OTnetic.
Table E.8: User Story 8-S
ID: 9-S
Priority: 9 - Should have
User story:
As an instructor, I want to be able to destroy and create a cyber range
instance based on a template, so that I do not have to waste time
doing it manually.
Description:
There should be a script that can be utilized in order to create and
destroy cyber ranges easily. The script will utilize a template written in
the "yaml" format. The template specifies the amount of virtual guest
machines in the range, IP addresses, OS’ etc.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that a cyber range needs to be re-instantiated or created for the
first time.
When the instructor destroys or create a new cyber range instance.
Then the cyber range details should be specified in a template to save
time upon destruction and creation of cyber range instances.
Table E.9: User Story 9-S
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ID: 10-S
Priority: 10 - Should have
User story:
As an instructor, I want the cyber range instance to have its own subnet,
so that I can launch multiple virtual machine instances that can
communicate with each other. (Possible to represent an infrastructure with
multiple machines)
Description:
The cyber range will have its own subnet and virtual machines in the range




Given that there are multiple virtual machines in the cyber range.
When a user is supposed to attack a machine or defend from an attacking
machine.
Then the machines must have the ability to communicate with each other
on the same subnet.
Table E.10: User Story 10-S
ID: 11-S
Priority: 11 - Should
User story:
As a user, I want the cyber range application to only allow certain
commands, so that the cyber range training easier to understand and use.
Description:
Interview data suggests that the current cyber security knowledge level of
the target group is limited. Therefore, the initial module and CLI-command
selection will be limited through the use of a python application.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that a user is unfamiliar with a CLI-interface.
When the user is entering the cyber range.
Then the user should not be overwhelmed with too many options and to
restrain the user from executing arbitrary commands causing the application
to crash.
Table E.11: User Story 11-S
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ID: 12-S
Priority: 12 - Should have
User story:
As a training participant, I want to be able to save my progress in the
cyber range, so that I do not have start from scratch if the application
closes or crashes.
Description:
The cyber range will include functionality that allows a user to quit and




Given that the user manages to close or crash the cyber range application.
When the user tries to restart the application.
Then the user should continue from where the user left off rather than
start from the beginning.
Table E.12: User Story 12-S
ID: 13-S
Priority: 13 - Could have
User story:
As a user, I want to be able to cooperate with other users during the
training, so that I can discuss a particular challenge/exercise with a colleague
and share our solutions.
Description:
A social platform could be included in the learning management system




Given that multiple users are training simultaneously.
When using a specific module.
Then they should be able to ask each other for help as this will
allow participants to share experiences and opinions.




Priority: 1 - Must have
User story:
As a manager, I want an effective alternative to conventional training
methods, so that I can increase the cyber security knowledge of my
employees in order to improve the security posture of my organization.
As a participant, I want an alternative training program that is more
effective than lectures, and more fun and motivating to use than traditional
training methods.
Description:
The training program should be be more
effective than traditional training
methods in terms of the user’s ability to gain knowledge and practical skill
related to various cyber security concepts such as authentication.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the participant requires additional cyber security training.
When the participant completes a module of the training program.
Then the participant’s knowledge the module’s security knowledge is
greater than before they completed the module.
Table E.14: User Story 1-TM
ID: 2-TM
Priority: 2 - Must have
User story:
As a training participant, I want the training content to include elements
from gamification so that the training becomes more motivating
and interesting.
Description:
The training program must include elements of gamification that will make




When a participant is performing the training program.
Given the participant wants to receive fun and motivating training content.
Then the training program should provide elements of game design, as this
has proven to create more motivating and engaging training.
Table E.15: User Story 2-TM
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ID: 3-TM
Priority: 3 - Must have
User story:
As a training participant, I want the training to include problem solving,
to make the participants more focused while training.
Description:
The training program will include challenges that will be increase the
participant’s ability to perform problem solving tasks. Using critical
thinking in order to solve problems will help create transferable knowledge.
Acceptance
criteria:
When an instructor is creating a new training module.
Given that the training module will be used to create transferable knowledge.
Then the training module should provide exercises that require some degree
of problem solving, in order to make the knowledge acquired through training
applicable in other scenarios.
Table E.16: User Story 3-TM
ID: 4-TM
Priority: 4 - Must have
User story:
As a participant, I want the training program to provide a difficulty level
that reflects my prior knowledge on a given topic related to cyber security.
Description:
The cyber security training program should allow for inclusion of multiple
modules related to different different subjects. Modules will have different




Given the participant only has basic knowledge of cyber security concepts.
When the participant utilizes the training program.
Then the user will be able to select a relevant module with an easy
difficulty level.
Table E.17: User Story 4-TM
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ID: 5-TM
Priority: 5 - Must have
User story:
As a participant, I want to be able to receive instructions and test my
knowledge while I am acquiring practical skills in the cyber range.
Description:
The training program should provide relevant information and instructions
that will help the user complete the cyber range training. There should
be a strong connection between practical tasks issued in the cyber range
and the information and questions
provided in the quiz part of the training program.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant is performing practical tasks in the cyber range.
Then the participant will receive information and questions related to
their challenge in the information/quiz portion of the training program.
Table E.18: User Story 5-TM
ID: 6-TM
Priority: 6 - Must have
User story:
As a participant, I want to learn about good and bad security practices
in order to prevent security incidents in the future.
Description:
The training program should show the participants examples of good and
bad security practices. This will provide them with a better understanding
security issues, while equipping them with the necessary skills to avoid bad
practices and employ good practices.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant is receiving information and performing tasks.
Then the participant is provided with examples and tasks illustrating
good and bad security practices.
Table E.19: User Story 6-TM
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ID: 7-TM
Priority: 7 - Must have
User story:
As a user, I want the training content I am provided with to be written in
Norwegian, as that is my native language and the language used in my
workplace.
Description:
The training program must be written in Norwegian, as the target group
is employees working in the Norwegian energy sector. It is important that
the target audience fully understands the information they are given. In
order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion. The training content
and program will be provided in the users native language.
Acceptance
criteria:
When the user is enrolled in the training program.
Given the user is Norwegian.
Then the training content should be provided in Norwegian.
Table E.20: User Story 7-TM
ID: 8-TM
Priority: 8 - Must have
User story:
As a manager, I want the information given in training program to reflect
the current security guidelines issued by NSM.
Description:
The training program should take NSM’s security guidelines into account
and reflect the current recommendations provided by NSM.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the administrator is creating a new module.
When a new module is under development.
Then the information should reflect the current recommendations provided
by NSM.
Table E.21: User Story 8-TM
ID: 9-TM
Priority: 9 - Must have
User story: As a participant, I want increasingly difficult challenges.
Description:
In addition to providing the ability to implement different modules,
each module in the training program should have challenges of increasing
difficulty in order to push the user learn more and build on the skills and
knowledge they acquire through the module.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant completes a challenge in the cyber range.
Then the next challenge should be slightly more difficult than the previous
challenge.
Table E.22: User Story 9-TM
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ID: 10-TM
Priority: 10 - Must have
User story:
As a participant, I want to see how cyber attacks are performed and gain
a greater understanding how security vulnerabilities are exploited.
Description:
The cyber range platform should provide participants with examples that




Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant is performing a challenge related to attacks in the
cyber range.
Then the participant is able to perform the attack and see how it works
and what the result is.
Table E.23: User Story 10-TM
ID: 11-TM
Priority: 11 - Should have
User story:
As a training participant, I want to be able experience how it is to be the
adversary in cyber operation and perform different cyber attacks, so that I
can understand how bad security practices allow for attacks by adversaries.
Description:
The cyber range platform should provide participants with an
understanding of the adversary’s perspective, and how poor security
practices can be exploited.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant is using the cyber range.
Then the participant is able to complete challenges related to red-team
activities.
Table E.24: User Story 11-TM
ID: 12-TM
Priority: 12 - Should have
User story:
As a participant, I want the training program to be fun and enjoyable so
that my motivation to complete the program is greater.
Description:
The training program should be fun to participate in. By using
gamification elements such as a point system, increasingly difficult




Given the participant requires training.
When the participant is using the training program.
Then the participant should find the program fun to participate in.
Table E.25: User Story 12-TM
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ID: 13-TM
Priority: 13 - Should have
User story:
As a training participant, I want to learn different tools and techniques
related to different security topics, so that I use these tools to improve
my understanding of security.
Description:
The training program should include different tools and techniques




Given the participant is using the training program.
When the participant is performing practical challenges.
Then the participant should given the ability to utilize real
tools and techniques.
Table E.26: User Story 13-TM
ID: 14-TM
Priority: 14 - Should have
User story:
As a training participant, I want parts of the training to be story-based,
so the training is more interesting and fun.
Description:
The training program should be story-based. Information and challenges




Given that there is a need for new training content.
When the instructor creates additional training content.
Then the training content should be story-based.
Table E.27: User Story 14-TM
ID: 15-TM
Priority: 15 - Could have
User story:
As a training participant, I want the training to include knowledge that
I can use in my personal life, so that I get motivated to learn more and
that the knowledge gained can be applied outside of work.
Description:
It is desirable that knowledge and skills can be transferred to the
participant’s personal life, resulting in increased personal security
in addition to better security practices in their work lives.
Acceptance
criteria:
Given that a participant is using the training program.
When they are introduced to new security concepts and various
techniques.
Then the knowledge gained by the participant should be applicable
in their personal lives.


















































The following is a list of evaluation metrics for each category, which are illustrated in figure
5.11. The list contains the metrics, with a short explanation for each metric. Based on these
metrics, questions were developed for the questionnaire where respondents were asked to
agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale.
Software
1. Deployment: is the program easy to implement by the client organization?
2. Usability: is the program easy to utilize by participants?
3. Stability: does the program function as expected during the training session?
4. Motivation: does the training program provide training in a motivating and engaging
fashion?
training Content
1. Motivation: does the training content provide information in a motivating and engaging
fashion?
2. Attitude: do the participants have changed attitudes towards the importance of secu-
rity?
3. Knowledge: does the training content provide new knowledge?
4. Relevance: do the participants find the material relevant for their role?




Interview Guide for OT-personnel in
the Norwegian Energy Sector
(Norwegian)
Hensikten med dette intervjuet er å få et bedre bilde av hvordan de som jobber med OT
ser på cybersikkerhet og om OT-ansatte får noe form for opplæring, kursing, etc. innen
cybersikkerhet. Før vi begynner vil vi opplyse om at svarene du gir oss ikke vil knyttes til
ditt navn. Hvis vi spør om noe som gjør det vanskelig å unngå sensitiv informasjon, er det
bare å si ifra slik at vi kan unngå dette.
H.1 Current Status of Training
1. Kan du fortelle meg om hva slags opplæring OT-personell får med tanke på IT-
sikkerhet?
2. Hvordan tror du at denne treningen kan bli bedre?
3. Føler du at disse treningsprogrammene gir et godt bilde av sikkerhetsproblematikken
knyttet til informasjonsteknologi?
4. Vet du om bedriften du jobber i har interne sikkerhetsregler for driftssystemer / ret-
tningslinjer IT-sikkerhet (f.eks passordregler, acceptable use policy)?
5. I hvilken grad opplever du at andre ansatte i bedriften følger disse reglene og ret-
ningslinjene?
H.2 Attitudes Towards Information Security
Noen mener at det er et tydelig skille mellom hva de som jobber med OT og IT er opptatt
av med tanke på sikkerhet (security/safety) og arbeidsoppgaver.
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1. Tror du kollegaene dine ville vært enige i denne påstanden?
2. Hva tror du de ansatte du jobber med tenker om at OT-ansatte eller andre som ikke
jobber i IT-avdelingen kan påvirke sikkerheten i bedriften? Tror du de fleste ansatte
ser på dette som et felles ansvar?
3. Tror du at de fleste i bedriften har ferdigheter og kunnskaper som gjør at de kan hjelpe
til i arbeidet med å sikre bedriften (eks. oppdage phishing eller feil verdier i SCADA)?
4. Tror du at ansatte er klare over at det er sårbarheter i OT-systemer som kan benyttes
av trusselaktører hvis de finnes (eks. ondsinnede hackere)? Vet du om noen slike
sårbarheter som har blitt oppdaget og fikset tidligere?
5. Hva tror du er den mest kritiske sikkerhetstrusselen (ikke safety) i OT-verden? Oppføl-
ging: Hva slags cyber-angrep mener du hadde hatt størst innvirkning på bedriften/samfunnet?
Hva slags cyber-angrep tror du er mest vanlig?
6. Har du eller noen andre opplevd en sikkerhetshendelse i bedriften du jobber i? Hvordan
ble dette håndtert?
H.3 Opinions On Development of a New Training Pro-
gram
Under masteroppgaven skal vi utforme et treningsprogram spesielt laget for de som jobber
med OT i energisektoren. For å kunne oppnåønsket resultat trenger vi litt hjelp fra de som
skal få treningen. Produktet vi forventer å utforme/bygge vil mest sannsynlig bli i form
av et rammeverk eller et program/applikasjon som bygger på prinsipper fra simulering og
"gamifisering" med forskjellige oppgaver og utfordringer.
1. Tror du at andre i bedriften som ikke jobber i IT-avdelingen synes dette med IT og
sikkerhet er vanskelig eller forvirrende?
2. Hva tenker du om å gjennomføre et treningsprogram hvor du får praktiske oppgaver og
ser IT-sikkerhet fra begge sider (forsvar/angrep)? Tror du andre hadde vært positive
til dette?
3. Er det noe spesielt du ønsker å lære mer om innen IT-sikkerhet, eller noe du tror det
er behov for i bedriften/sektoren?
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Appendix I
Interview Guide for Security
Consulting Company (Norwegian)
I.1 Current Status of Training
1. Kan du fortelle meg om hvordan opplæring innen cybersikkerhet fungerer i bedriftene
du jobber med?
2. Hva slags trening tilbyr dere til nye ansatte som skal jobbe med sikkerhet?
3. Har bedriftene klare planer for roller og ansvarsfordeling dersom en sikkerhetshendelse
forekommer?
4. Føler du at disse treningsprogrammene gjør en tydelig merkbar forskjell i forbindelse
med kunnskap og forberedthet?
5. Føler du at disse treningsprogramme mangler noe i forhold til bevissthet om sikkerhets-
problematikk eller teknisk forberedelse?
6. Tilbyr NC-Spectrum noe form for opplæring innen sikkerhet for deres kunder?
7. Hvilken form for trening har opplevd at er mest kostnadseffektiv?
I.2 Security Requirements in the Energy Sector
1. Er det noen spesifikke eller unike sikkerhetskrav som er felles for bedriftene i energisek-
toren? (eller i annen kritisk infrastruktur?)
2. Er det mange krav som skiller seg veldig fra hverandre, eller har de stort sett like
sikkerhetsutfordringer?
3. Bruker disse bedriftene betydelig mer ressurser påcybersikkerhet enn andre bedrifter?
4. Kan du si noe om sikkerhetsproblemer eller -situasjoner som er unike for bedrifter i
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denne sektoren? (f.eks med tanke påat de drifter CPS-er, ansvar for sikkerhet, in-
nvirkning påsamfunnet osv)
5. Anser du disse bedriftene som attraktive mål for cyberkriminelle eller andre ondsinnede
aktører?
I.3 Attack Simulation
1. Hva slags type angrep forkommer oftest i ditt selskap og dine kunders selskaper? Hva
slags type angrep har høyest innvirkning?
2. Benytter dere cyber ranges eller andre former for blue/red team trening (ifm pene-
trasjonstesting)?
3. Tenker du at åsimulere spesifikke angrepstyper i en kontrollert setting for sikkerhetsspe-
sialister i deres selskap kunne forbedret egenskapene til deltagerne? (gjøre dem mer
forberedt påslike angrep i en realistisk setting)
4. Hva tror du kan være utfordrende med en slik treningsmodell?
5. Hva tror du kunne vært fordelaktig med å implementere en slik modell?
I.4 Use of Existing Training Frameworks
1. Bruker dere noen eksisterende rammeverk for trening som er relevant for cybersikker-
het? (Hvis ja: hvilke? Følg opp...)
2. Hvordan har dere tilpasset disse rammeverkene til å passe deres unike behov og sikker-
hetskrav?
3. Hva er er deres nåværende fokusområder i rammeverkene og programmene dere bruker?
(eks. deteksjon, forhinding, risikostyring etc.)
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